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Abstract 
 
Jalisco’s corn producers from the Cienega province are locked in a cycle of low profitability. 
The corn producers have been affected by the lack of access to adequate financial 
intermediaries such as banks. The cycle of low profitability contributes towards a low quality 
of life and a lack of competitiveness. Hence, farmers have not been able to adjust to the fierce 
competition from the US producers. A lack of trustworthy collateral is a major problem in 
order to get access to credits. The grain receipts system (GRS) provides a method of 
collateralizing crops for access to credits, using smart cards as a shortcut for cash 
withdrawals. With the GRS the risk is not intended to be eliminated; instead it is a mechanism 
where the risk is shared between the corn producers, elevators and banks which are the 
subject of analysis in this study using the agency theory.  
 
Surveys were employed in order to obtain a broad picture about how farmers finance their 
activities, to provide knowledge concerning their agricultural and post harvest practices and 
their perception concerning the GRS and its feasibility. Currently some of the farmers have to 
wait at least one month for payment after delivery. Furthermore, most of the farmers cannot 
buy the inputs in advance due to the fact that after they are paid after having paid off their 
debt obligations. Consequently, farmers just have money to cover their livelihood expenses 
and not to invest in inputs. Consequently, farmers are not satisfied with their income because 
of high input prices and low prices of grain at harvest time. In addition, about one fourth of 
the farmers produces just one crop and faces a portfolio problem. Most of the farmers receive 
financial support from the informal credit sector such as elevators or suppliers. Therefore the 
farmers face the control problem due to the fact that they may become unwillingly attached to 
a specific elevator. The reason is that the farmer cannot freely decide where to deliver their 
grain because the elevator provides credit. Additionally, in the formal credit sector the farmers 
have never been able to use grain as collateral. Land is the most desirable collateral for the 
banks.       
 
Consequently, almost half of the farmers agree with the method of collateralizing their crops 
after harvest and using smart cards to withdraw cash from automated teller machines. Within 
a GRS the farmers solve the control problem due to the fact that the farmers can freely decide 
where to deliver their grain and ensure independent quality measurements. Furthermore, 
according to the analyses the farmers do not face any horizon problems using the GRS. On the 
other hand, despite of the fact that the banks  view GRS favorably they face horizon problems 
and are not interested in investing in the required equipment for a GRS system such as 
developing smart cards to allocate ATMs among elevators’ facilities or in rural communities. 
The banks prefer that the farmers are paid by checks which force them to visit the bank to 
complete formal procedures, which by farmers are considered as awkward and time-
consuming. 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Key terms: Grain receipts, Mexico, Agency theory, Rural finance, Warehouse receipts 
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Sammanfattning 
 
Jaliscos majsproducenter i Cienegaregionen är fast i en cirkel av låg lönsamhet. 
Majsproducenterna har påverkats av bristen på tillgång till lämpliga finansiella förmedlare såsom 
banker. Cirkeln av låg lönsamhet bidrar till en sämre livskvalitet och försämrar möjligheterna för 
jordbrukarna att vara konkurrenskraftiga. Därför har lantbrukarna inte lyckats anpassa sig och 
svara mot den hårda konkurrensen från USAs producenter. Bristen på en tillförlitlig säkerhet är ett 
avgörande problem i sökandet att få tillgång till krediter. Systemet med spannmålskvitton (GRS) 
är en metod som bidrar till möjligheten att använda spannmål som säkerhet vid lån, där bankkort 
används för att underlätta kontantuttag. Syftet med spannmålskvitton är inte att eliminera risken, 
istället är det en mekanism där risken fördelas mellan majsproducenter, spannmålsmagasin och 
banker vilka samtliga är föremål för analys i den här studien med hjälp av agent teorin.  
 
Följaktligen gjordes enkätundersökningar för att få en bred bild av hur lantbrukare i 
Cienegaregionen finansierar sin verksamhet, förmedla kunskap angående deras jordbrukande och 
skördevanor samt för att få grepp om deras uppfattning av GRS och dess genomförbarhet. För 
närvarande får en del av lantbrukarna vänta minst en månad på betalning efter leverans. Dessutom, 
kan de flesta av lantbrukarna inte köpa investeringsmateriel i förväg, eftersom de får betalningen 
först efter att de har fullföljt sina skuldförpliktelser. På grund av höga kostnader för 
investeringsmaterial och låga marknadspriser vid skördetid är lantbrukarna därför inte nöjda med 
sin inkomst. Dessutom producerar omkring en fjärdedel av jordbrukarna endast en gröda och står 
därför inför ett portfolioproblem. De flesta av lantbrukarna får finansiellt stöd från den informella 
kreditsektorn såsom spannmålsmagasin eller leverantörer. Därför ställs lantbrukarna även inför ett 
kontrollproblem eftersom de ofrivilligt kan komma att binda sig till ett visst spannmålsmagasin. 
Anledningen är att lantbrukarna inte fritt kan bestämma vart de ska leverera sin spannmål 
eftersom spannmålsmagasinet bidrar med sin kredit. Vidare har lantbrukarna aldrig haft möjlighet 
att använda spannmål som säkerhet eftersom mark är den mest åtråvärda säkerheten för bankerna. 
 
Närmare hälften av lantbrukarna stödjer metoden att använda sin gröda som säkerhet för lån efter 
skörd samt att använda kort för att göra kontantuttag från bankomater. Med hjälp av GRS kan 
lantbrukarna lösa kontrollproblemet eftersom de kan välja fritt vart de ska leverera sin spannmål 
samt självständigt säkerhetsställa kvalitetsmätningar. Enligt analyserna ställs lantbrukarna inte 
heller inför något horisontproblem när de använder GRS. Å andra sidan, trots det faktum att 
bankerna sympatiserade med GRS-systemet, står de inför ett horisontproblem eftersom de inte är 
intresserade av att investera i den nödvändiga utrustningen för att implementera ett GRS system, 
såsom utvecklingen av ett kort för att implementera bankomater bland spannmålsmagasinen eller 
på landsbygden. Bankerna föredrar att bönderna betalas med check vilket tvingar dem att besöka 
banken för att fullfölja alla sedvanliga formella procedurer, vilket ofta ses som krångligt och 
tidskrävande bland lantbrukarna. 
 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
Nyckelord: Spannmålskvitton, Mexiko, Agent Teorin, Jordbruksfinansiering, Majs 
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Resumen 
 
Los productores de maíz de la Cienega de Jalisco están paralizados en un círculo no 
redituable. Los maiceros han sido afectados por la falta de financiamiento. El círculo de nula 
o poca redituabilidad los posiciona en un bajo nivel de calidad de vida y sus alrededores están 
posicionados en un medio ambiente de poca o nula competitividad. Por lo tanto los 
agricultores no han podido con la competencia descomunal en la producción de maíz por 
parte de los Estados Unidos. Por otra parte, varios de los productores han sido forzados a 
dejar sus terrenos y buscar trabajo no calificado en las zonas urbanas o emigrar a los Estados 
Unidos en busca del “Sueño Americano”. Adicionalmente los productores también enfrentan 
la falta de garantías, lo cual es un problema para acceder a créditos. El sistema de reportos de 
granos mencionado en este estudio proporciona un método para ofrecer en prenda la cosecha 
de los agricultores. De esta forma se destruye el círculo de poca redituabilidad y se mejora la 
competitividad en la zona maicera de la Cienega de Jalisco. Con el sistema de reportos el 
riesgo no se elimina, sino se administra y comparte entre los productores, almacenadores y 
bancos los cuales son mencionados en este estudio dentro de la teoría de la agencia. 
 
Por lo tanto se aplicaron encuestas con el propósito de tener una opinión general de como los 
productores financian sus actividades. Adicionalmente proveer conocimiento en cuanto a sus 
prácticas agrícolas, de post cosecha y que es lo que opinan del sistema de reportos y su 
factibilidad. Actualmente una parte considerable de los productores tienen que esperar al 
menos un mes para que les paguen su cosecha. Además la mayoría no pueden comprar sus 
insumos en las pre-ventas debido a que en cuanto tienen el pago de sus cosechas tienen que 
enfrentar el pago de deuda de los insumos utilizados en la previa temporada. 
Consecuentemente los productores apenas tienen el ingreso para cubrir su sustento y no para 
invertir en insumos. Por lo tanto los productores no están satisfechos con su ingreso, debido a 
los altos precios de los insumos y el bajo precio de su maíz al ser cosechado. Casi la mitad de 
los maiceros y almacenadores están de acuerdo con el sistema de reportos. Una cuarta parte 
de los productores entrevistados solo tienen como ingreso el cultivo del maíz por lo cual 
enfrentan un problema de portafolio. La gran parte de los productores reciben financiamiento 
del sector informal como almacenadores de grano o proveedores de insumos. Por lo que pone 
a los productores en un problema de control debido a que se ven involuntariamente obligados 
a entregar al acopio que les provee de crédito. Por lo tanto el productor no tiene la libertad de 
entregar su grano donde a el le convenga. Adicionalmente, en el sector del crédito formal 
estos productores no han podido utilizar su grano como colateral, debido a que el colateral 
más preciado por los bancos es el terreno.  
 
Consecuentemente, casi la mitad de los productores están de acuerdo con el método de utilizar 
su cosecha como colateral y el utilizar tarjetas inteligentes en los cajeros automáticos sin 
enfrentar algún problema de horizonte. Por lo contrario, a pesar de que los bancos 
entrevistados ven favorable el sistema de reportos, presentan un problema de horizonte al no 
estar dispuestos a invertir en tarjetas inteligentes y distribuir cajeros automáticos en los 
almacenadores o en las comunidades rurales. Estos bancos prefieren que el pago a los 
agricultores sea en cheque nominativo y obligar al productor a que vaya a la sucursal del 
banco para elaborar los procedimientos formales, los cuales son considerados por los 
productores como complicados y tardados.  
__________________________________________________________________________ 
Palabras Clave: Reportos, Certificados de depósito, México, Teoría de la agencia, 
Financiamiento rural, Crédito prendario. 
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 1 
1 Introduction 
 
“With the advance of globalization and greater integration of agricultural 
markets, the need for increases in agricultural productivity for family farms is 
particularly pressing. Raising productivity and output of small farmers would 
not only increase their incomes and food security, but also stimulate the rest 
of the economy and contribute to broad-based food security and poverty 
alleviation.” (Lipton Michael, 2005, p.V).  
 
Many farmers in developing countries, or economies in transition, are locked in a cycle of 
poverty due to the lack of credit from financial institutions. Those financial problems do not 
only affect farmers’ livelihoods but also agricultural suppliers, traders and industries as well. 
Commonly corn producers often have short term cash flow problems, their income remains 
low and in addition they have to deal with production risk due to weather conditions as well 
as price risk. Furthermore, the lack of infrastructure to store their grain and the need of money 
to meet debt obligations and living expenses cause farmers to be in a weak position when 
negotiating prices (Boehnke, 2003). Farmers are considered as price takers because even if 
prices fall below production cost, they cannot afford to diversify or to change market prices. 
They sell their products even knowing that current prices are not favorable, contributing to 
even worse economic conditions (UNCTAD, 2004). Hence farmers may no longer meet 
traders or industry’s requirements due to the lack of financing and can not afford improved 
agricultural inputs, production technologies or improvements of agricultural practices, which 
place farmers in a hazardous position. Before farmers are able to adopt new technologies and 
make major investments on their farms they need access to inexpensive loans. But cheap 
loans are not always available, due to the fact that formal credit institutions are not likely to 
lend to farmers, because corn producers are considered to be a risky business (ASERCA, 
2002). Therefore informal credits entities such as traders, large farmers, landlords, elevators, 
etc. are likely to lend to farmers even knowing that interest rates will be higher in the informal 
sector compared to formal credit institutions (Sarris, 1996). Farmers need access to credit in 
order to fulfill their working capital needs. By this way they can invest in new farm assets, 
technology and post harvest equipment. If not, they will not be able to compete and meet 
market’s needs (UNCTAD, 2004).  
 
In most developing countries the access to credit has been constrained since most of the banks 
are only willing to lend to certain fixed assets that are easy to sell. However, a farmer who 
lacks trustworthy collaterals1, and faces risks regarding price and yields, makes lending to him 
difficult from the perspective of the banks (Varangis et al. 2003). Furthermore, the traditional 
agricultural credit scheme amounted to subsidizing interest rates and imposing lending targets 
by governments. The credits were usually allocated to larger farms and small scale farmers 
were kept out of reach from any credit program. Often those credits were offered to the wrong 
                                                
1
 Collateral is a valuable property owned by someone who wants to borrow money which they agree will become 
the property of the company or person who lends the money if the debt is not paid back 
 
 2 
farmers, for instance to those with political connections. Those farmers also became used to 
receive debt relieves by the government. Therefore farmers were badly affected, thereby 
contributing towards bad reputation on debt obligations (UNCTAD 2004).    
 
On the one hand financing is important in order to release farmers’ potential of growth and 
poverty alleviation. On the other hand, making access to financing easier is not sufficient to 
improve farmers’ lifestyles or to break the cycle of poverty. Farmers also need access to more 
modern grain marketing techniques such as grain receipts, new production technologies, 
better agricultural practices, inputs such as genetically modified or hybrid seeds, 
environmentally friendly pesticides, fertilizers, and better market and trading conditions 
(UNCTAD 2004).  
 
 
1.1 Problem Formulation 
 
How can a Grain Receipt System (GRS) increase access to credits, improve agricultural 
practices and trading conditions for the Cienega’s corn producers and thereby contribute to 
rural development and enhanced international competitiveness in grain production.  
 
With the GRS the farmer can deposit the grain in a certified elevator which issues a 
negotiable receipt as proof of quantity, quality and location of the grain. Hence the farmer can 
pledge the receipt of the grain as collateral when asking for a loan to a bank.  
 
In order to face this problem the following issues are identified:  
- What are the benefits and obstacles of grain receipts as collateral for 
farmers, elevators and banks located in the Cienega?  
 
- How a system with grain receipts as collateral could be introduced in the 
Cienega region.  
 
1.2 Aim and Demarcations 
 
The aim of this research is to examine the feasibility to apply grain receipts as collateral from 
the perspective of corn producers focusing on the Cienega, a region within the state of Jalisco 
in Mexico. The objective is to demonstrate how grain receipts may operate and how it can be 
applied in the region. 
 
This research will focus on the counties of Ocotlan, Tototlan, Zapotlan del Rey and La Barca, 
counties that all belong to the Cienega region. The farmers of these counties grow corn 
mainly under rain-fed conditions. Due to rain-fed conditions, corn yields are relatively high 
compared to the national level (SIAP, 2006). The research involves different stakeholders that 
are involved in the Grain Receipt System, such as elevators and banks. However the main 
focus will be on the farmers’ perspective.  
 3 
1.3 Outline  
 
 
Chapter 1 
Involves 
introduction, problem 
formulation, aim 
 and demarcation. 
Chapter 2 
 
Describes the 
problem background 
of grain marketing 
and agricultural 
credits. 
Chapter 3 
 
Addresses the 
concept of GRS and 
an overview of the 
Cienega. 
Chapter 4 
 
Relates the agency 
theory, its problems  
and costs. 
Chapter 5 
 
Connects the agency 
theory with the grain 
receipt concept. 
 
Chapter 6 
 
Offers the hypothesis 
for the study. 
Chapter 8 
 
Shows the results 
from the surveys 
and phone 
interviews.  
Chapter 9 
Presents analysis and 
discussion from 
theory, hypotheses, 
results and the 
application of GRS.  
Chapter 10 
 
Suggests 
conclusions and 
further research 
of the study.  
Chapter 7 
 
 Describes the 
chosen method and 
approach of the 
study. 
  
 4 
2 Problem Background  
 
“Competitiveness in agriculture is through clusters and strategic alliances 
not through specific products” (Galarza M. Juan M. et al. 2004 p.101).  
 
Previous to the liberalization of the economies many governments in developing countries 
were directly involved in the domestic purchasing, handling, transporting, marketing, storage 
of commodities and inputs’ financing. Given these circumstances farmers could be paid fixed 
prices and be protected from price fluctuations (Boehnke 2003). With the liberalization of 
trade and the development towards non state-owned companies that are in charge of 
marketing commodities, such as grains, farmers are forced to fend for themselves and find 
their own grain merchants. Farmers naturally face a lack of market power therefore they 
frequently sell their grain to the first buyer at the offered price (Boehnke 2003). Therefore the 
removal of state-owned companies in charge of grain marketing causes a lack of financial 
services the rural areas and a lack of infrastructure such as warehouses and elevators for 
agricultural commodities creating constraints in the grain marketing chain (Boehnke 2003). 
 
Mexico, as an economy in transition, was trade protected until the decade of the eighties. In 
1991 Mexico began negotiations towards the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA). In January 1994 it was finally implemented and it was expected to lead to an 
automatic transformation of the Mexican agriculture (Yunez-Naude & Barceinas, 2002). 
Agriculture in Mexico is a sensitive sector due to the fact that the rural population is 
approximately 24.75 million, counting for as much as 25% of the total population (ASERCA, 
2004). Commonly the Mexican rural sector consist of many and rather small communities that 
are scattered all over the country, mostly concentrated to the south of Mexico. Their progress 
has been constrained due to geographical location and low social impact (ASERCA, 2004). 
Nowadays, globalization and free trade are vital parts of the entire Mexican economy. 
Unfortunately free trade has affected to the less developed rural communities negatively. The 
Mexican trade policies, which opened up the economy, without first supporting the less 
developed communities, is one of the reasons why these communities still remain 
uncompetitive toward free trade agreements (Yunez-Naude & Barceinas, 2002). Therefore 
many farmers of the rural communities have been forced to leave their land and search for a 
low wage jobs in the urban areas or cross the USA border to find the “American Dream”. 
Hence emigration rates from rural areas are increasing. For instance, approximately 45% and 
80% of the rural population has a relative working in the USA or living outside of their 
communities, respectively (INTERNET, 1, House of Representatives, 2006).  
 
As an economy in transition, Mexico has been implementing changes within agricultural 
policies in order to accomplish competitiveness. But those changes have had limited success, 
especially within the grain sector, such as corn for which the majority of the rural population 
depends on (INTERNET, 1, House of Representatives, 2006). Therefore farmers have not 
been able to adjust to the fierce competition from the USA within the corn production. The 
competitiveness of the Mexican farmers has been adversely affected by high production costs, 
 5 
poor credit systems and the lack of machinery, irrigation systems and agribiotechnology. 
Hence the corn industry such as starch, fructose, livestock feeders and milling prefer to import 
corn from the USA rather than buying locally (INTERNET, 2, House of Representatives, 
2006). 
 
Mexico is an asymmetric country where the gap between the haves and have-nots has been 
increasing. There is a wide difference between the urban and the rural areas. The same gap is 
visible within the agricultural sector, where some farmers are internationally competitive and 
some others hardly have food to survive. The crop production such as corn is not an 
exception, where in some places corn is grown by irrigated systems and in other places it is 
grown under rain-fed conditions. These growth practices do not mean to be the best or the 
worst. For instance the most productive place for corn in the winter is the state of Sinaloa 
where the corn is grown mostly under irrigated systems. On the other hand, mainly with rain-
fed conditions, Jalisco is considered to be the best corn producer during the spring season. 
These places are considered to have the highest yield of corn compared to the rest of the 
country where yields are lower (SIAP, 2006).  
 
Free trade agreements such as NAFTA could affect Mexican corn producers negatively due to 
the fact that corn will be fully liberalized from tariffs and quotas in the year of 2008. Full 
liberalization might cause an almost immediate collapse of Mexican grain production and 
politically dangerous grain dependence from the USA (Yunez-Naude A. 2002). On the other 
hand Mexico is the world leading exporter of avocado, mango, papaya, strawberry, tomato, 
asparagus, eggplant, chili and onion (Hallam et al. 2004). Therefore those who could grasp 
free trade benefits would be fruit and vegetable producers and the ones that are in a hazardous 
position are the corn producers (Yunez-Naude A. 2002). What should the corn producers do? 
Should Mexico be totally grain-dependent from the USA and should the 24.75 million people 
in the rural communities find new ways of living? Or is there perhaps a way to strengthen the 
corn producers’ situation to better be prepare for the future competition?  
 
 
2.1 Mexican Grain Merchandising  
 
In the sixties the Mexican state-owned industry CONASUPO (Popular Subsistence National 
Company) was created in order to buy and handle grain (Cebada, Ma del Carmen, 2001). Due 
to the protection of the economy, CONASUPO was responsible for grain imports, storage, 
domestic market supply, grain handling and maintaining a stable and seasonally subsidized 
price (ASERCA, Dec 2004). By the end of the eighties the Mexican Government determined 
to eliminate the state-owned CONASUPO. Due to the elimination of CONASUPO an 
important link was now missing in the grain industry. Problems started to appear such as lack 
of private enterprises in charge of the grain handling, lack of infrastructure and storage, 
handling, transportation and distribution. Even though CONASUPO’S facilities were 
transferred to rural communities the lack of knowledge, organization and large self-interest 
among farmers caused problems that made the use of facilities unfeasible.  
 6 
Additionally, financial support for farmers and grain merchandisers were insufficient or non-
existent for the grain production and marketing. After CONASUPO was banned between 
1989 and 1990 the grain market suffered the hardest time in its history. Almost nobody was 
able to buy, store and handle grain (ASERCA, Dec 2004).  
 
 
2.2 Mexican Agricultural Credit 
 
The Mexican financial sector believes that agriculture is a risky business with low 
profitability. Therefore Mexican agricultural credit is risky and considered three times more 
expensive in Mexico than agricultural credits offered in the USA (ASERCA, 2002). Credit 
risk is defined as the risk of financial loss as a result of a client or a trading partner failing to 
meet its contractual obligations. For example a borrower may fail to repay a loan (Roth 
Benedict 2003). One of the major problems facing the banks within the agricultural sector is 
the lack of trustworthy collateral since the land that some farmers use for growing crops is 
leased and the machinery that they use is not well accepted as collateral (ASERCA, 2002).  
 
The access to agricultural credit in Mexico has not been sufficient in order to enhance 
competitiveness among corn producers. The agricultural credit in Mexico has been reduced, 
for instance in 1994, 2.72% from the Mexican GDP was destined to agricultural credits and in 
2000 only 0.99% of its GDP was destined for the same purposes (INTERNET, 3, House of 
Representatives, 2006). The Mexican devaluation of 1995 constrained the agricultural credit 
for at least the next five years. Consequently the informal credit sector such as, moneylenders, 
elevators and suppliers of agricultural products among others increase their lending to the 
agricultural sector.   
 
For the peasant farmers it is almost impossible to get credit from the formal credit sector. For 
instance they have possession of the land through tenancy but not the ownership which causes 
the lack of trustworthy collateral. But even if they have the ownership of the land2, the banks 
are reluctant to accept land as trustworthy collateral because it is not classified as private 
property. Mexican corn producers have been facing difficulties with credits. A way to cope 
with the lack of credits might be grain receipts as collateral. Grain receipts provide a method 
of collateralizing crops and lowering the risk to the lender, therefore decreasing financial 
charges to the farmer as a borrower (Lacroix & Varangis, 1996). Using grain receipts may 
mobilize credit to Mexican farmers, facilitate sales of grain throughout the year rather than 
just after the harvest, improve corn quality and transparency of the storage industry, lower 
post harvest losses due to better storage conditions and to improve the farmers’ 
competitiveness within the corn industry. Such benefits could also include a regulatory 
environment for the stakeholders involved such as banks, elevators, processors and farmers.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
2
 Land legally classified as “Ejido” or “Comunal” and cannot be used as private property.  
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3 Grain Receipt System 
 
3.1 What are Grain Receipts?  
 
With the liberalization of trade and the opening of markets for grain receipts, or warehouse 
receipts as they also are labeled, are becoming more important in the transition to improve 
agricultural markets (Commodity markets, 1997). A grain receipt is a negotiable document 
issued by an elevator operator as proof of specific quantity and quality of a commodity such 
as corn in this case. The corn has been deposited in a particular location by a named depositor 
(farmer).  The elevator is responsible for the grain, providing storage services, ensuring grain 
quality and has not yet any legal interest to it. The grain receipt can be negotiable, allowing 
transfer to a new holder (bank) and the grain is pledged as collateral for a loan. The holder of 
the grain receipt (GR) is allowed to take delivery of the grain presenting the GR at the 
elevator. The holder of the GR is responsible to cover the services that the elevator has 
provided (Coulter & Onumah, 2002).   
 
Collateralized lending includes assets or commodities. Commodities may be already produced 
or might be produced to be collateralized; these commodities will be kept in an elevator which 
will issue a non-negotiable or negotiable receipt (Figure 1). Non-negotiable receipts can not 
be used as possession of collaterals. On the other hand negotiable receipts are to possess the 
collateral which automatically gives the bank possession of the commodity stored in the 
warehouse. Therefore if the borrower defaults, the bank can make use of the collateral to 
cover a given loan (UNCTAD, 1996).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Collateralized lending 
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The traditional system of agricultural credit is based on taking the risk in regards to the 
borrower (farmer). With the GR the risk is not intended to be eliminated; instead it is a system 
where risk managing is shared between the stakeholders. The performance of the system 
depends on the stakeholders rather than just only on the borrower’s risk (farmer). As a result 
the risk for the bank and the farmer is much lower, so grain receipts for agricultural lending 
could become a useful tool to enhance agribusiness’ competitiveness (UNCTAD 2004). 
 
In developing countries, or economies in transition, financing costs can be very high. The 
reason for collateralized financing is to reduce the risk to the lender and to make it easier for 
the borrower. Providing more security to credit providers tends to improve credits in rural 
communities. Commodities are suitable for providing security to lenders. Using a GR is the 
same concept as mortgaging a house, whereby a bank can lend against the house that is acting 
as collateral. Collateralized financing can make credits more accessible and cheaper. 
Therefore it is important that the quality of the grain meets market requirements. It also makes 
it easier to sell grain on description rather than by sample due to the fact that the quality is 
carefully specified and checked by the grain elevators (UNCTAD 1996). 
 
 
3.2 Grain Receipts Stakeholders 
 
Corn, as most of the commodities, does not go directly from producers to consumers. 
Middlemen such as traders, brokers or elevators need to be included. Corn is inevitably linked 
to elevators. Grain receipts are crucial elements for risk mitigation, enabling a financer to lend 
to a borrower. Banks will lend against grain stored in a reliable elevator. (Figure 2) So grain 
receipts provide a way of risk mitigation and also the basic structure of futures contracts3 
(Day-Robinson, 2003). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
3
 A legal obligation to deliver (a sell) or accept delivery (a buy) of a specific commodity with contract terms 
standardized (Catlett & Libbin, 1999). 
Figure 2: Primary stakeholders 
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Farmers have to face mainly two kinds of risks. On the one hand the price volatility because it 
is difficult to forecast the selling price of the commodity that would be produced. On the other 
hand the physical risk of loss or damage to the crop due to weather conditions, harvesting 
losses, storage or handling (Day-Robinson, 2003). Therefore, risk management impact 
farmers’ income, productivity and access to credit (Varangis et al. 2003). Farmers are exposed 
to price fluctuations causing them uncertainty about the price that they will receive for their 
grain when it is sold. This uncertainty for farmers makes it hard for them to allocate resources 
efficiently; their access to credit is constrained and leads them to adopt less suitable 
technologies that affect yields and therefore their income is reduced. Additionally, the lack of 
skills, information and capital to try to invest in new enterprises makes it difficult for farmers 
to diversify (Varangis et al. 2003). 
 
Elevators play a key role within the Grain Receipt System (GRS). A licensed elevator must 
have and fulfill the following requirements: Adequate facilities, capital adequacy, managerial 
qualities and insurance. Grain handling staff for weighing, sampling and grading should be 
licensed as well. Elevators’ reputation will be determined by its management, operations and 
financial strength. Therefore a person that owns an elevator must be reliable, somebody that 
sells the grain and must not disappear with the money (UNCTAD, 1996). 
 
Licensed elevators must be willing to accept official supervision without previous 
announcement. Those supervisors are authorized to suspend the elevator’s license 
immediately (Coulter & Onumah, 2002). Licensing and inspection of elevators are essential to 
make sure that grain elevators meet basic standards both physically and financially. If these 
standards cannot be fulfilled a GRS will not be credible and the grain will not be treated as 
reliable collateral (Boehnke, 2003). 
 
 
3.3 How a Grain Receipt System Works 
 
A grain receipt system is illustrated in Figure 3. The following flows are identified:  
 
1. At harvest the farmer delivers his grain into a licensed elevator.  
2. The elevator registers the quality, quantity and location of the grain on a smart card, 
which act as a physical proof of the ownership of the grain and informs the availability 
of credit, it also can generate data for instance the cost of hedging the grain.   
3. To receive the payment in cash, the farmer inserts the smart card in the ATM.  
4. Before the due date of the loan or when the buyer needs the grain, the farmer sells the 
grain consulting with the bank. 
5. After the farmer pays for the grain and storage services, the elevator make the 
transaction to the bank for the value of the grain and the bank pays any exceeding 
amount as a profit to the farmer.  
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3.4 The Essentials of GRS 
3.4.1 A Functional Legislation Environment  
Governments ought to be in charge to license the elevators and work with the private sector 
such as processors or industry to establish viable quality and standards. (Figure 4) Those 
standards should be specific enough to give a clear description of grain quality (Boehnke, 
2003). The grain receipt must specify the quantity, quality and location of the grain stored. 
Also rights and duties for the stakeholders such as elevator, farmer and bank must be clearly 
defined. It is important that grain receipts are negotiable and equivalent in cash. The holder of 
the GR has the right to receive the grain or the equivalent if the farmer fails repayment or if 
the elevator is defaulting. Furthermore it is mandatory for a well functioning grain receipt 
system to have a legal environment that gives confidence for stakeholders especially the 
banks that lend against grain receipts (Martin & Bryde, 1999). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BANK 
 
FARMER 
 
 
ELEVATOR 
ATM 
        Buyer 
Figure 3: Grain Receipt System (UNCTAD, 2002). 
 
Grain Flow 
 
 
Cash Flow 
 
 
Information Flow  
(Smart cards) 
2 
3 
4 
1 
5 
Author’s Own 
Figure 4: A legal environment for a grain receipt system. 
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3.4.2 Grain Prices that Reflect Carrying Charges 
In order for a grain receipt system to appear of economic interest to the farmer, the elevator 
and the bank, an increment in prices ought to exist after harvest that cover carrying charges 
such as, storage, transporting and handling cost of the grain. Storage cost ought to be 
reasonable so that the farmers can pay the cost through additional income derived from the 
future sales of grain in lean seasons (Boehnke, 2003). On the other hand, if the market is 
protected with subsidized grain prices, it is not attractive for the farmer to postpone sales of  
grain at a prospected higher price since it is unlikely to happen. Furthermore for banks to lend 
against grain receipts there should exist a market information system where regular grain 
prices are published. Such a market information system allows for banks and farmers to 
obtain a useful tool for decision making for various actions regarding the best time to sell or 
buy the grain (Martin & Bryde, 1999). For instance Mexican historic price from 1998 to 2005 
of corn placed in Guadalajara, Mexico at harvest time is usually lower but once carrying 
charges appear in the lean season, price increases compared to the harvest season. (Figure 5) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.4.3 Reliable and Functional Elevators 
The location of the elevators should be in close proximity to the harvest areas that allow 
farmers to easily transport their grain to the elevator. To be able to fulfill procedures for 
establishing quality standards such as weighing, sampling, drying and sorting, elevators 
should include well maintained facilities. The elevators’ role is essential for the success of a 
grain receipt system. Hence the elevator should be the first one to recover the payment of its 
services prior to delivery of the grain. Elevators, as inspected entities and issuers of receipts 
which are equivalent as cash, must fulfill agreement standards such as financial strength, grain 
management and administrative competence. Therefore it is important that inspectors have 
knowledge on grain and financial management, because they will be empowered to eliminate 
licenses if the elevators do not meet the requirements. In addition the inspections will be 
conducted without previous announcement and must be accepted by the elevators (Martin & 
Bryde, 1999). 
Figure 5: Harvest season’s prices vs. Lean season’s prices, corn placed in Guadalajara, Mexico.  
Source Market Information Systems – SNIIM www.economia-sniim.gob.mx 
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3.4.4 Backup Plan 
It is important to have a backup plan that covers possible fraud or careless behavior from the 
licensed elevator. If the elevator cannot deliver the grain due to any kind of fatality that is out 
of reach of the elevator an indemnity fund should be implemented as early as possible to 
cover the risk (Martin & Bryde, 1999). 
 
3.4.5 Banks’ Confidence in the Grain Receipt System  
The role of the banks is crucial to the success of the GRS. The banks need to invest in training 
their staff and monitoring the price of the grain that is used as collateral (Boehnke, 2003). In 
addition banks should be involved in the process of elevators licensing. Therefore banks will 
feel self-confident with the process since they are lending the money. Some banks may only 
lend a proportion of the grain receipt to cover the loan granted in the case that grain prices 
decrease. Banks usually lend a specific percentage of the commodity’s value. This percentage 
is to hedge the cost that lenders have to incur when selling the commodity in case the 
borrower fails to meet debt obligations and if the commodity’s price fall as well. Moreover, 
grain receipts can be suitable with hedging programs such as futures, options4 or forward 
markets5 that can be used by farmers, elevators or banks (World Bank, 2005).    
 
 
3.5 Benefits of Grain Receipts  
A grain receipt system provides benefits such as: supporting trade, improving market 
efficiency, facilitating access to rural finance and price risk management (Coulter & Onumah, 
2002).  
3.5.1 Supporting Trade 
With the GRS the grain is issued with a specific quality, quantity and location. The elevator is 
able to provide information about inventories available on demand from the industry. The 
farmers are able to participate in an efficient grain supply chain where quality is reliable. The 
GRS encourages farmers to fulfill grain standards that the industry demands and the elevators 
are forced to stop cheating on weight and quality. Furthermore, farmers will no more be 
forced to sell their grain in close proximity to the harvest, a time when prices usually are the 
lowest (Coulter & Onumah, 2002). 
 
3.5.2 Improving Market Efficiency 
The use of elevators as delivery location allows transparent trade in agricultural commodities 
between farmers and industry. Furthermore farmers will be able to access to credits using the 
grain as collateral. Licensed elevators will provide better storage systems and thereby post 
harvest losses may decrease considerably. Transparency will be enhanced in the storage sector 
                                                
4
 Options: a contract that gives the buyer the right but not the obligations to obtain an item/service. The seller of 
the contract has an obligation to perform, should the buyer exercise the right (Catlett & Libbin, 1999). 
5
 Forward sell: The act of selling an item for future delivery (Catlett & Libbin, 1999). 
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due to the presence of continuous and unannounced inspections. The sorting of grain 
improves quality and the industry reliance on GR making farmers and elevators reliable 
suppliers (Coulter & Onumah, 2002). 
 
3.5.3 Facilitating Access to Rural Finance  
A GRS contribute towards providing accessible financing to rural communities. The risk for 
banks is reduced when grain is used as collateral, which is more tradable than real estate. The 
bank does not need to monitor a large number of borrowers (farmers) but just a few elevators 
to guarantee loan performance. This fact tends to reduce transaction costs and foster lending 
to the agricultural sector, improve farmers’ quality of life and provide a credit environment 
that raises competitiveness among farmers (Coulter & Onumah, 2002). 
 
3.5.4 Decreasing Price Risk 
In transition economies farmers commonly lack a system for decreasing price risk. Therefore 
their income is affected and the ability to repay the loans decreases. A GRS may be connected 
with hedging strategies that locks in a floor price. With such strategies bank and farmers are 
able to adjust to price risk, making credits cheaper for the borrower and perhaps increasing 
the size of the loan (Coulter & Onumah, 2002). 
 
Table 1 Benefits and Constraints of Grain Receipts6 
Creating secure collateral and facilitating access to credit in rural communities.  
Improvement of grain quality. Transparency of operations of elevators since 
they require licensing and inspection.  
Facilitating the creation of commodity markets such as futures and options - 
contracts that improve competition and market information.  
Since GR are regulated and with a specified quality the farmers tend to become 
reliable suppliers in the grain marketing chain. 
Benefits 
GR provides an instrument to obtain access to credit at competitive rates for 
farmers. Also GR provides comfort to banks as the risk of providing loans is 
reduced since the grain serves as collateral. Therefore the GR contributes to 
making the grain sector more efficient and transparent.  
There may be Government interventions in market prices which may decrease.  
A lack of a regulatory environment that ensures confidence in local elevators 
High interest rates that make financing unattractive for farmers  
Low quality infrastructure which make elevators unreliable in terms of grain 
quality 
Constraints 
Elevators that are not spread throughout production areas by that may cause 
transportation cost to become exceedingly high for distant farmers. Rough roads 
that make grain transportation difficult from production zones to the elevators. 
                                                
6
 Boehnke, 2003 
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3.6 Overview of the Cienega Region 
 
This study is focused on the Cienega region that 
is located in the state of Jalisco, near the 
Chapala Lake and the second largest Mexican 
city called Guadalajara. (Figure 6) The study is 
based on counties that belong to the Cienega. 
Those counties are Ocotlan, Zapotlan del Rey, 
Tototlan and La Barca.  
 
The Cienega, as most places in Mexico, is 
surrounded by inequalities. On the one hand 
corn is the leading crop on land planted and it is  
considered to be the most productive region in terms of corn yields within the state of Jalisco  
(Table 1) (INTERNET, COPLADE, 2006). Corn yields are between 7 and 11 tons per hectare 
under rain-fed conditions (SIAP, 2006). Besides corn production, livestock is also important 
such as dairy, beef, poultry, broiler, sheep and swine. On the other hand the Cienega has 
problems as most of the rural areas in Mexico. Lack of financial resources to fulfill working 
capital needs, uneducated population, unemployment, poor infrastructure in rural areas and 
polluted rivers and lakes are some reasons for farmers to feel forced to leave or lease their 
land. Those are also reasons for high emigration rates in rural communities. People look for 
better life conditions and opportunities in urban areas or migrate into the USA (INTERNET, 
COPLADE, 2006).     
 
 
 
                                                
7
 Land size represents 6% of the total size of Jalisco and approximately 1 % of the total size of Sweden. 
8
 Number of animals. 
Table 2 Brief facts of the Cienega 
Land size7 4,892 Km2 
Temperature
 average 18-22°C 
Population 454, 088 
Dairy 138, 853 
Beef 151, 786 
Corn 
Spring 
137, 198 hectares. 
Swine 391, 896 
Sheep 14, 284 
Sorghum 
Spring 
21, 720 hectares. 
Broiler 6, 858, 352 
Livestock8 
Poultry 6, 559, 121 
Crops 
Wheat 
Winter 
21, 345 hectares. 
Source: INTERNET Oeidrus (2006)  -  SIAP (2006) 
Figure 6: The Cienega Region in Jalisco, Mexico.  
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4 Agency Theory 
 
“If you want something done right, do it yourself” (Sappington, 1991, p.45). 
 
According to Jensen and Meckling (1976, p.308) companies are important entities for 
providing relationships between people. Often society is slightly believing that companies are 
individuals with motivations or intentions. Companies belong to a concept of legal fiction 
serving as a framework for contractual relationships. 
   
Within the agency theory developed by Jensen and Meckling (1976) the agency relationship is 
defined as a “contract under which one or more persons (the principal) engage another 
person (the agent) to perform some services on their behalf which involves delegating some 
decision making authority to the agent”.  
 
One of the most important tasks for the principal is the selection of a competent agent. As an 
example a company that strives to select the least cost supplier or a bank that is searching for 
the most reliable loan applicant. Therefore the relationship begins when the principal offers a 
contract to the agent. Such a contract includes specifications of payments, according to the 
agent’s performance whereupon the agent decides to accept or decline the contract. Thereby 
the agent decides how much effort he should allocate to fulfill the contract’s specifications 
and also if those specifications are convenient for the agent’s interests (Sappington, 1991).  
 
The principal may feel forced to hire an agent when the tasks are too complicated or too 
costly to conduct himself. Therefore the agent has special skills or knowledge required to 
perform the task in question. The most important concern is how the principal can best 
motivate the agent to perform the principal’s preferences, considering the difficulties in 
monitoring the agent’s performance, since the principal cannot observe the agent’s efforts 
(Sappington, 1991). The principal and the agent signs a reward contract where the agent 
chooses an action that the principal cannot control, even events beyond the agent’s control 
might happen. As a result the actions and events establish the agent’s performance, and then 
the agent receives the compensation agreed upon in the contract (Gibbons 2005).  
 
At the beginning of the relationship between the principal and the agent, the same beliefs are 
shared since conflicting interests and asymmetric information have not yet arisen 
(Sappington, 1991). However, within the relationship the agent may be risk averse due to the 
fact that his efforts impact the principal. On the other hand the principal may be risk neutral 
due to the fact that he has the option to diversify between different agents (Shapiro, 2005). 
The principal has also the bargaining position of a “take it or leave it” offer to the agent 
(Sappington, 1991). If the relationship between principal and agent causes them to each 
maximize their own utility then the agent will not always act and behave according to the best 
interests of the principal. However, the principal may handle the agent’s interests by 
establishing suitable incentives and information systems (monitoring cost) for the agent. 
Consequently the agent’s irregular actions that could damage the principal’s welfare will be 
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limited. On the other hand the agent will make an effort (bonding cost) to ensure that he will 
not take actions that could damage the principal. Most of the times the principal and the 
agent’s relationship will not occur at zero cost, because in someway monitoring and bonding 
costs cannot be eliminated (Jensen & Meckling 1976). 
 
Frequently in the agency relationship the principal and the agent will acquire a positive 
monitoring and bonding cost. Additionally, there will be some differences with 
unconventional events out of the agent’s control which would increase or decrease the 
principal’s welfare. If those differences experience a reduction of the principal’s welfare then 
there is a cost. This latter cost is labeled by Jensen and Meckling (1976) as the “residual loss”. 
Consequently the incentives, monitoring, bonding and other ways of social control represent 
the essentials of the contract between the principal and the agent’s relationship (Shapiro, 
2005). 
 
 
4.1 Agency Problems 
 
At the beginning of the relationship the shared believes avoid any asymmetric information 
between the principal and the agent (Sappington, 1991). But through the time or when the 
relationship is becoming more complicated the existence of problems such as horizon, 
portfolio, decision making and control will arise.  
 
4.1.1 Horizon Problem 
Horizon problems occur when an individual’s objectives are fulfilled the net income 
generated by an asset and that fulfillment is shorter than the remaining productive life span of 
that asset. Therefore the horizon problem creates a disincentive environment for members’ 
investments that may contribute to growth opportunities (Cook, 1995). Consequently 
problems arise since the principal could have a short term perspective and only focus on what 
benefits he/she may perceive in a short period of time. This could mitigate long term prospect 
for growth opportunities.    
 
4.1.2 Portfolio Problem 
A portfolio problem is risk-oriented. Asymmetries of preferences between the principal and 
the agent may arise due to disparities in risk preferences and how incentives are handled in 
order to reduce asymmetries between the agents and the principal. The agency theory usually 
takes for granted that principals are risk neutral and agents risk averse. Furthermore agents 
prefer more wealth to less, but the marginal utility decreases as more wealth is accumulated 
(Anthony & Govindarajan, 1998).  
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4.1.3 Decision Making Problem 
Decision making may affect the principal’s wealth. This problem is enhanced when there is a 
wide variety of interests and the potential gains are greater among principals that rely on one 
agent (Sykuta & Cook, 2001). Therefore the agent may not know how to cope with such a 
diversity of wishes and interests from the principals. 
 
4.1.4 Control Problem 
A control problem arises due to asymmetric information between the principal and the agent. 
Asymmetric information implies a lack of data from the principal’s side regarding how the 
agent intends to develop its services, which the principal cannot control. On the one hand the 
principal is bearing the risk due to a lack of information regarding the agent’s behavior. But 
on the other hand the agent might take advantage of his position as the controller of the 
information and might act according to his own interest. Hence, the agent may prefer to 
maximize his own utility rather than maximizing the principal’s utility (Jensen & Meckling 
1976). 
 
To reduce the various problems mentioned above the principal can apply information systems 
to monitor and control the agent’s performance. Incentives are other ways to manage agency 
problems. Some incentives could be penalizing the agent for his worst performance instead of 
rewarding for a good performance (Sappington, 1991). As a result monitoring and incentives 
becomes the base for the contract between the agent and the principal (Shapiro 2005). 
Competition also plays an important role among principal and agent. The threat of 
competition may serve to improve the agent’s performance and result in providing additional 
incentives from the principal to the agent (Sappington, 1991).  
 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) point out that the problem of inducing an agent to behave as if he 
was maximizing the principal’s utility exists in all kind of organizations such as universities, 
companies, cooperatives, governments and unions. But for Shapiro (2005) the main actors 
which are the principal and the agent have an interchangeable role which means that they 
could be both at the same time, according to the situation that they face.    
 
 
4.2 Agency Costs 
 
The agency costs are defined as the sum of monitoring cost, bonding cost and residual loss 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976).  
4.2.1 Monitoring  
Monitoring is the implementation of a system by the principal designed to control the agent’s 
behavior and interests that could potentially damage the principal’s welfare or utility in some 
way.  
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4.2.2 Bonding  
Bonding is the effort made by the agent in order to reduce all types of behavior that could 
damage the principal’s utility or to behave in such a manner that the principal is able to 
improve his utility.  
4.2.3 Residual Loss 
Residual loss is a monetary loss for the principal due to unusual events or decisions made by 
the agent that could cause the avoidance of utility maximization of the principal. For Shapiro 
(2005) the agency costs do not only arise from monitoring or bonding. Additionally, costs 
increase due to recruitment, specific preferences, providing incentives, moral vulnerability, 
self dealing, corruption and insurance. Furthermore costs also increase due to the principal’s 
fear that the agents might act in their self interests. Therefore procedures or protocols that 
limit the agent’s discretion tend to raise agency cost. On the one hand the cost will increase if 
cooperative efforts are involved, but on the other hand, if strong incentives exist for the agent, 
then the agency costs will decrease (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). For Jensen (1986) 
incentives are important in order to decrease the agency costs and increase the agent’s 
performance.  
 
“Rational individuals always choose the option that makes them better off as they see it”. In 
other words they decide the action that best fits a better outcome. Since primitive men self 
interests exist, for instance the land was not equally fertile and they faced incentives to 
cultivate one piece of land rather than another. That reveals that incentives exist in all cases 
where individuals have choices, and this happens in companies as well as in nature. Monetary 
incentives are not always the best method to motivate the agent’s performance because people 
are also motivated by other things. But money is essential when individuals are best 
motivated financially rather than through other methods (Jensen, 1994).  
 
Agents care about success and failure, they have emotions and care about honor or even have 
altruistic motives and therefore they also feel shame and pride. The perfect agent is the one 
who makes decisions with no concern for his own preferences, and only cares about other 
individuals along with the principal. Therefore, for Jensen (1994), the perfect agent does not 
exist, for instance not even Mother Teresa was a perfect agent because her preferences 
evidenced a strong desire to help the poor of Calcutta over other alternatives. For that reason 
she was self-interested exhibiting her own preferences (Jensen, 1994). 
 
The agency theory suggests that since people are self-interested in some way, they will face 
conflicts of interests causing problems for both sides of the relationship between the principal 
and the agent. Therefore a strong motivation to reduce the differences between the principal 
and the agent is needed in order to decrease agency costs. Moreover the two parties are 
interdependent and are cooperatively acting as a cluster even knowing that both sides have 
different goals (Lassar & Kerr, 1996).  
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Another way to improve the agent’s performance and to reduce the agency cost is suggested 
by Jensen (1986). Jensen claims that is a reason for agents to become more efficient due to the 
threat of failing debt obligations. Jensen and Meckling (1976) mention that it is difficult to 
find a company that is almost totally financed with debt due to the fact that lenders are 
unlikely to lend to a company where more than ninety-nine percent of the capital is composed 
by debt. Since the borrower has too little to lose, or even if the borrower has a very low 
probability to succeed, the borrower captures most of the prospective gains. On the other hand 
if the borrower cannot fulfill payment obligations the lender assumes most of the cost.  
 
Agency costs increase or decrease according to the level of monitoring. For instance the 
existence of a number of principals and agents might increase information asymmetries 
therefore monitoring will be more difficult and cause agency costs to increase. On the other 
hand long relationships between the principal and the agent lead to a partnership through the 
time, where the principal and the agent know each other better. Therefore reputation and trust 
are developed, then the agency cost decreases and the principal and agent’s utility will be 
maximized (Shapiro 2005). 
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5 Agency Theory and Grain Receipts  
 
According to the agency theory in Jensen and Meckling (1976, p.308) a relationship is 
described as: “a contract under which one person (the principal) engages another person (the 
agent) to perform some services on their behalf which involves delegating some decision 
making authority to the agent”. An individual can be principal and agent at the same time but 
in different relationships (Shapiro 2005). For this study, where farmer, elevator and bank play 
a key role, within the grain receipt system, the principal and the agent are an exchangeable 
process. In this study two scenarios will be presented: A and B.  (Figure 7) 
 
 
 
On the one hand the relationship between the farmer as the principal and the elevator as the 
agent (A). On the other hand the farmer is the agent and the bank is the principal (B). For 
scenario A the farmer is acting as the principal because he has the option to diversify the 
location of his grain through elevators. The elevator is willing to accept delivery of the 
farmer’s grain that fulfills quality standards. Hence an agreement is conducted between the 
agent and the principal. Consequently for scenario B the principal (bank) can accept or deny 
the farmer’s credit request. The agent is willing to accept the bank’s announcement if he does 
or does not fulfill the bank’s credit requirements. Those relationships involve the agency 
problems and cost concepts.  
 
 
 
Principal 
 
FARMER 
 
 
      Agent 
 
ELEVATOR 
 
Principal 
 
    BANK 
 
 
      Agent 
 
   FARMER 
A 
B 
Figure 7: Principal and Agent Relationship between Farmer – Elevator (A) and Bank – Farmer (B) 
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5.1 Agency Problems and Grain Receipts 
 
Endeavors from the stakeholders should be done for the well functioning of a grain receipt 
system. However during the process problems might arise such as horizon, portfolio, decision 
making and control problems.  
 
5.1.1 Horizon Problem 
 
Given the relationship between farmer and elevator some investments may be carried through 
on both sides. The farmer that has to improve his agricultural practices should invest in 
machinery and improve inputs such as environmentally friendly pesticides and seeds that 
improve yields and grain quality. Therefore, if the farmer is used to grow a certain kind of 
variety that does not yield a good quality grain but he still can place it in the market, then is 
not worth for him to invest in a costly hybrid seed with higher yield. Other options are disease 
resistance and better grain quality or to invest in environmental friendly pesticides. The 
elevator may invest in equipment for improved grain management and information systems in 
order to gather information from farmers. Such investments may be expensive for the 
elevator. Therefore the manager of the elevator may not be willing to invest when he currently 
can sell the grain to livestock feeders. The bank should invest in information technology such 
as smart cards and ATMs. Furthermore there should be a well trained staff for rural lending. 
Hence the bank may not be willing to invest in the above mentioned, since rural lending is 
considered a risky business compared to urban lending which is more attractive for banks. 
Therefore such improvements may be viewed as an overinvestment by the stakeholders. 
 
5.1.2 Portfolio Problem 
 
As a risk-oriented problem, a portfolio problem emerges facing the stakeholders such as 
farmer, elevator and bank. With a grain receipt system the risk of default is not expected to be 
eliminated but it is expected to be shared by the stakeholders. The farmer may reduce the risk 
by utilizing hedging strategies such as options, futures and forward contracts as well. By these 
methods the farmer is assured that grain prices will be at least at the same price level as when 
he placed his hedge while asking for the loan. The elevator may receive assurance on facilities 
that protect grain inventories maintains grain quality. The bank as a lender may use grain as 
secure collateral in case the farmer fails to meet his debt obligations. Therefore the banks may 
be willing to increase lending to rural areas.  
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5.1.3 Decision Making Problem 
 
With a grain receipt system rights and duties are clearly specified for the stakeholders. Clear 
rules are formed to avoid misunderstandings. The electronic receipt formalizes the contract 
between the farmer and the elevator. The contract between the bank and the farmer is 
formalized when the loan and the collateral are provided. However decision making problems 
may arise within the relationship between farmer and elevator since the elevator has to deal 
with many farmers and to accommodate their different interests. For instance some farmers 
may not use all grain as collateral. Therefore the elevator has to allocate grain that will be 
used as collateral and grain that will be used for other purposes according to the farmers’ 
interests. If the grain quality is standardized, the elevator may find it easier to allocate the 
grain within the storage facilities.  
 
5.1.4 Control Problem 
 
Asymmetric information may cause control problems. The relationship between the farmer as 
a principal and the elevator as an agent is characterized by the farmer’s lack of information 
about how the elevator is managing grain weight measurement and sampling procedures. 
Therefore, within a grain receipt system the elevator faces the separation of ownership 
between various grains and incentives may apply in terms of paying for storage and handling 
services. On the other hand the relationship between the bank as a principal and the farmer as 
an agent is characterized by a reduction of asymmetric information due to the fact that the 
principal is provided with information by the elevator as well as the smart cards. Therefore 
the bank only has a few elevators to control rather than hundreds of farmers. For the farmer 
the being granted a loan applies as an incentive due to the threat of failing debt obligations 
(Jensen, 1986).      
 
 
5.2 Agency Costs Mitigated by Grain Receipts 
 
The agency theory mentions the existence of asymmetric information between the principal 
and the agent. Grain receipts may mitigate asymmetric information problems. For instance in 
scenario B (figure 7) the bank without a grain receipt system has to monitor a tremendous 
amount of farmers that enhance monitoring cost. Therefore credit will be expensive for the 
borrowers since the monitoring costs will be reflected on the farmer’s credit. With a grain 
receipt system the asymmetries of information may decrease considerably due to the fact that 
the bank has to monitor a few elevators instead of a large number of farmers. Hence the credit 
will be cheaper for farmers since the bank decreases its monitoring cost, thereby also making 
credit more accessible for farmers. In addition, bank lending may increase due to the fact that 
the credit is guaranteed with the grain as collateral.  
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For scenario A (figure 7) the elevator decreases its advantage of controlling information, 
because it will be forced to stop cheating on weight and sampling procedures due to the 
unexpected visits of supervisors and fear of lose the license. On the other hand without a grain 
receipt system the elevator has complete information in order to take advantage according to 
its own interests in detriment to principal’s (farmers) interests. Grain receipts also involve 
incentives for the agents. For instance in scenario A, the elevator has the incentive of being 
the first to recover the payments of its services before the grain is delivered, building 
reputation as a reliable elevator, showing financial strength, marketing the elevators 
operations and being a good supplier to industries and livestock feeders. The principal 
(farmers) can increase his utility if, within the lean season, corn prices increase while corn is 
stored. Access to credit is another incentive for the principal. Therefore the farmer can use 
grain as collateral and sell corn in the lean season instead of being forced to sell immediately 
after harvest.  
 
Given scenario B the principal’s lending increases with a grain receipt system since secure 
collateral is provided. The agent has the incentive to solve his working capital needs and an 
incentive to repay which forces the farmer to become more efficient due to the threat of 
failing debt obligations (Jensen 1986). Therefore a farmer that wants to use grain as collateral 
be planning in advance in order to prepare his field, acquire better hybrid seeds, use 
environmentally friendly pesticides, fertilizers and apply better agricultural practices in order 
to be able to deliver grain with good quality. 
 
 
5.3 The Relationship between the Farmer as the Principal 
and the Elevator as the Agent.  
 
Referring to scenario “A” in figure 7 for Mexican farmers, being the owner of a grain elevator 
is too costly. Therefore they may feel forced to hire an elevator to store their grain using a 
grain receipt concept. Hence the principal pays to the agent for his services of storing and 
handling the grain. The agent puts effort to guarantee that he will not take actions that could 
affect the principal such as cheating on weight and sampling. The grain receipt formalizes the 
contract between the relationship of the principal and the agent. Therefore, for the principal 
the grain receipt provides information, such as weight, location and quality of the grain. The 
elevator may feel pressure by knowing that the grain does not belong to him. The separation 
of ownership induces the elevator to work more efficiently due to the threat of losing his 
license or failing to meet the principal’s interest (Fama & Jensen, 1983). The relationship 
farmer-elevator is based on trust and likely to share similar interest for the corn supply chain. 
Consequently, the agency costs may decrease since they share the same beliefs. On the other 
hand, asymmetric information may occur at the delivery of the grain since the farmer has little 
information about grain quality measurement methods. The elevator may take advantage of 
that, fulfilling its own interest and not to the principal’s interests.   
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5.3.1 Monitoring 
 
The use of the grain receipt decreases the need for monitoring the agent since the information 
that the principal requires is specified on the receipt. Monitoring the agent’s operations such 
as weight and grading will be done by the authorities thereby decreasing the principal’s 
monitoring cost. By this method, the principal does not have to assume the monitoring cost. 
 
5.3.2 Bonding 
 
The agent makes an effort to guarantee that he will not take actions that could affect the 
principal negatively, such as cheating on weight and sampling. Additionally, the elevator 
should acquire a license to be able to participate in the grain receipt system. The staff should 
be licensed as well. The elevator staff may keep records of the farmers such as their yield per 
hectare, costs per hectare, and the variety of corn seeds planted. Moreover, investing in 
information technology in order to be synchronized with the bank increases the bonding costs 
for the agent. For the agent bonding costs increase considerably since without a grain receipt 
system since the elevator is not forced to invest. On the other hand, without a grain receipt 
system the elevator may become more passive and lose market share in a competitive local 
market where efficiency and truthful operations are important for being a reliable corn 
supplier.  
 
5.3.3 Residual Loss 
 
Residual loss may appear in the relationship between the elevator and the farmer. Unusual 
events could happen to the elevator, for instance a warehouse explosion, earthquakes and 
extreme weather conditions such as strong winds, thunder and lighting and storms that could 
damage the elevator facilities. Moreover, extreme weather conditions may affect the 
principal’s utility considerably since yield expectations are based on weather conditions 
because corn production in the area takes place mainly under rain-fed conditions. Therefore 
low yields will be obtained and the quality of grain decreases considerably.    
 
5.3.4 Partnering for Competitiveness 
 
Problems in business relationships occur due to the partners attempt to avoid being cheated by 
each other (Ford et al. 2000). For instance, farmers mix dry grain with moist grain in the 
trucks in order to get average moisture content. By this method they are cheating with the 
elevator and affecting its grain management. On the other hand, the elevator may be cheating 
on weight and rising moisture contents as well (Per. Com. Garcia, 2006). The relationship in 
which the farmer and the elevator cheat each other will affect their economic returns as well 
as the incentives. Therefore farmer and elevator should work together for mutual benefits. The 
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development of trust can is an important way of reducing agency cost within the principal and 
the agent relationship (Shapiro, 2005).     
 
The relations between farmer and elevator do not just happen. Those relations require efforts 
on both parties to develop. Therefore efforts include costs of monitoring and bonding 
according to the agency theory. The farmer has to grow his corn in the best way possible in 
order to fulfill market requirements. Furthermore if the farmer is planning to use the grain as 
collateral then he must fulfill the elevator’s requirements in order to be accepted by the bank 
for loan eligibility. The elevator has to make efforts as well, such as to employ a qualified 
staff, functional facilities and sufficient financial records in order to be licensed in a grain 
receipt system. This license can be used by the elevator as a marketing strategy for acquiring 
more grain from farmers and to create a reliable elevator reputation.  
 
Farmers and elevators belong to the corn supply chain. Both are suppliers to the corn 
processor industry. Therefore they should be partnering and committed to each other in order 
to decrease the agency cost as much as possible. Partnering means working together for 
mutual benefits, it involves pooling resources, sharing costs and cooperating in ways that 
mutually benefit all parties involved in the partnership. The partnering requires an 
understanding of elevators and farmers needs and capabilities to establish a clear goal. This 
goal is to create and maintain a loyal, trustworthy and reliable relationship that will allow the 
principal and the agent to maximize their economic returns, while promoting improvements in 
grain quality, storage techniques and competitiveness (Goetsch & Stanley, 2000). 
 
Competitiveness is defined as “the ability to profitably create and deliver value through cost 
leadership or product differentiation” (Kennedy et al. 1997). Commonly competitiveness of 
agribusiness such as production and grain elevators has been commodity based; therefore the 
focus has mainly been on price competitiveness. On the other hand, the food industry has 
focused on product differentiation and adding value such as functional foods9. Corn as a 
commodity is price based because its attributes are fixed (Kennedy et al. 1997). However, if a 
farmer is efficient and competitive is largely determined by linkages between elevators and 
industry. Individuals that work in a cooperative way, instead of working independently may 
be in a stronger competitive position (O’Keeffe, 1994). 
 
A market of non-differentiated products such as corn causes agribusiness firms to compete 
through cost leadership. For instance economies of size are important for cost reduction. 
Farmers can join forces in order to increase their purchasing power and get price discounts on 
inputs such as fertilizers, seeds and pesticides. In addition, proximity between farmers and 
elevators is important since they develop a close interaction where the transaction costs such 
as transportation is reduced (O’Keeffe, 1994). Even though corn is treated as a commodity 
within agribiotechnological sector may change. Added value may be given through attributes 
                                                
9
 A food with ingredients either naturally occurring or added that provides a health benefit beyond the traditional 
nutrient value of the food. (Wildman, 2001) 
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of corn therefore the competitiveness might change from a cost leadership to value added 
competitiveness (Kennedy et al. 1997). 
 
A grain receipt system requires endeavors from all the players. Hence, sooner or later those 
endeavors will pay off when farmer and elevator become reliable suppliers for the corn 
industry. In addition, farmers’ access to credit will be easier, therefore their working capital 
needs will be fulfilled.     
 
 
5.4 The Relationship between the Bank as the Principal and 
the Farmer as the Agent.  
 
Banks lend money to reliable farmers that satisfied the grain quality standards. Credit is 
important for the economic performance of corn producers. Regarding scenario “B” from 
figure 7 the relationship between corn producers and the bank is due to that credit helps to 
solve the working capital problems. Limited access to credits decreases the competitiveness of 
corn producers. Agency costs mention the benefits of debt as an incentive due to the threat of 
failing debt repayment obligations (Jensen, 1986). For the Cienega corn producers this theory 
may be applicable because if they are indebted they might feel the pressure to meet the 
repayments. Therefore they, improve their competitiveness due to the threat of failing the 
repayment and not to be labeled by the bank as “defaulters”.  
 
Banks prefer to finance more reliable farmers because those borrowers are characterized by 
lower credit risk. For the bank, monitoring involves observation on the farmer’s progress in 
order to get information about repayment of the loan. It may also include monitoring variables 
such as cost per hectare and yield per hectare (Nasr et al. 1998). The bank’s cost of the 
agent’s monitoring will be transferred to the agent through the credit cost, making the credit 
more expensive for the farmer. This type of credit has a high probability to be obtained by 
farmers’ cooperatives compared to individual farmers due to the fact that cooperatives have 
more collateral to offer to the bank. Individual farmers are expected to be credit constrained 
due to high monitoring costs since they are scattered in rural areas and sometimes without a 
credit history. Monitoring is costly; therefore credit will be costly for farmers. A grain receipt 
model may smooth the agency costs described by Jensen and Meckling (1976).  
 
5.4.1 Monitoring 
 
The principal’s (bank) monitoring cost includes yield per hectare among others. Within a 
grain receipt system the principal’s monitoring cost decreases considerably since the 
monitoring cost can be provided by the licensed elevator. Therefore the principal only has to 
monitor a few elevators rather than monitoring hundreds of farmers. By this method the 
agency costs decrease and make credit less expensive and affordable for individual farmers 
and cooperatives solving their credit needs. (Figure 8) Banks may invest in information 
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technologies to be synchronized with the elevators and also train its staff for the grain receipt 
system.   
 
 
 
 
5.4.2 Bonding 
 
The farmer that uses grain as collateral is preparing in advance to fulfill grain quality 
standards, to be able to receive credit from the bank and to formalize the relationship. Those 
preparations represent a bonding cost to the farmer. Prior to guaranteeing the credit and after 
receiving the credit there will be a bonding cost due to repayment of the loan. Farmers have to 
improve their agricultural practices when producing corn. At harvest time they have to be 
aware of the operator of the combine in order to ensure that good quality grain is being 
harvested.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8: Conventional Credit System vs. Grain Receipts Credit for Scenario “B”  Author’s Own 
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6 Hypotheses  
 
After the concepts of grain receipt and agency theory have been described the hypothesis will 
be developed. The hypotheses are based on grain receipts and the agency theory for the 
relationship between the principal and the agent. These hypotheses will lead to the analysis of 
the results and to clarify the prospective benefits and obstacles of grain receipts. The 
hypotheses are classified according to the agency problems which are, control, horizon, 
portfolio and decision making. 
 
• Control Problem 
 
A grain receipt system reduces the control problem. The asymmetric information among the 
bank as the principal and the farmers as the agents is reduced (scenario B). The bank 
decreases the monitoring costs because it only has to monitor a few elevators instead of 
hundreds of farmers. In the event of the farmer as the principal and the elevator as the agent 
(scenario A) the asymmetric information problem is reduced as well, due to the fact that the 
elevator has to operate transparently making it more difficult to cheat. 
 
• Horizon Problem 
 
Diversity among the farmers in terms of age, hectares planted of corn, years growing corn and 
financial satisfaction may induce a horizon problem for the grain receipt system. The 
stakeholders of a grain receipt system have to conduct some investments. Farmers should 
invest in better agricultural inputs and improve their agricultural practices to improve grain 
quality and higher yields. Investments in facilities, training staff and grain handling 
equipment should be made by the elevator. Banks should train their staff and invest in 
information technology systems and distribute ATMs to the elevators in order to facilitate the 
access to cash for farmers.   
 
• Portfolio Problem 
 
A grain receipt system decreases the portfolio problem for both farmers and banks. The 
reason is that grain receipts foster the use of hedging strategies designed to reduce price risk 
while making the access of financial support easier and more affordable for farmers. In 
addition the banks will be willing to lend against secure collaterals, such as grain receipts. 
 
• Decision making Problem 
 
Criteria for delivering the grain into the elevators may affect the decision making of the 
farmers. For instance, the selection of a reliable elevator where farmers feel confident or 
satisfied with grain quality measurements becomes important. In addition, the elevators may 
face difficulties to fulfill the farmers’ interests, because some of them may only use a fraction 
of the grain as collateral while others may not be interested in grain receipts at all. 
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7 Method 
 
To fulfill the aim the thesis it is written using an abductive approach and with both qualitative 
and quantitative methods. A survey method is applied in order to obtain a broad picture about 
their agricultural and post harvest practices and how farmers finance their agricultural 
activities, and who they perceive the grain receipt system and its feasibility. Such methods 
consist of surveys with fixed-alternative questions to farmers and elevators from the Cienega 
region, also phone interviews with fixed-alternative questions to banks. (Appendix 1)   
 
The study is initialized by using internet, available literature and other sources regarding 
previous research on the area of interest. The structure of the thesis is based on the agency 
theory, where the competitiveness and partnership issues associated with grain receipts and its 
applications are described. Moreover a schematic model of grain receipts system for the 
Cienega region is developed. 
 
A survey is a flexible way of obtaining data from people about motives, attitudes, awareness, 
lifestyle and preferences. In addition a variety of questions may be asked verbally, in writing, 
or via computer. Moreover the surveys have a structure that their answers can be fixed-
alternative questions which require that the respondents select from a predetermined set of 
alternatives. This structure has several advantages such that those questions are simple to 
administrate, the data is reliable because the responses are limited to the alternatives stated, 
and the interpretation of data is relatively simple. On the other hand the disadvantages are that 
the respondents may be unable or unwilling to provide the desired information. For instance, 
respondents may be unwilling to respond if the information requested is sensitive or personal 
(Malhotra, 1999).  For this study the surveys for the farmers, banks and elevators are mainly 
structured in fixed-alternative questions such as, multiple choice, rank-order scale and likert 
scale.  
 
Multiple-choice questions are provided by the researcher and the respondents are asked to 
select one or more of the alternatives. The rank-order scaling is a technique where 
respondents are presented with several objects simultaneously and asked to order or rank them 
according to some criterion. The Likert scale is a rating scale that requires the respondents to 
indicate a degree of agreement or disagreement, satisfaction or dissatisfaction, with each of a 
series of statements about the stimulus objects. Moreover the decision to use an odd or even 
number within the scale such as, Likert scale depends on whether some of the respondents 
may be neutral on the response being measured. If a neutral or indifferent response is desired 
an odd number scale should be used. On the other hand if the researcher would like to force a 
response or believes that no neutral or indifferent responses exist, an even number scale 
should be used (Malhotra, 1999). 
 
The surveys are statistically analyzed with PHSTAT2 (2003). Such analysis consists of 
contingency tables and a hypothesis test of independence and homogeneity with 2χ  (chi-
square). A contingency table, or cross-tabulation, is a cross classification of attributes between 
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categories, where the hypothesis to be tested is of no association, dependence or homogeneity 
between the categories (Newbold et al. 2003). According to Mann (2004) a test of 
independence or no association includes the test of null hypothesis ( )0H  where the attributes 
of the categories of a given population are not related against an alternative hypothesis ( )1H  
where the attributes of the categories are related or dependent. Such test is made by using the 
2χ  (chi-square) distribution. Within a test of independence the degrees of freedom are as 
follow; ( )( )11 −−= CRdf  where R and C are the number of rows and columns, respectively 
in the given contingency table. The value of the test statistic 2χ  (chi-square) for a test of 
independence is calculated as: ( )∑ −=
E
EO 22χ
 where O and E are the observed and expected 
frequencies, respectively for a cell. In addition for the fulfillment of the expected frequencies 
in this study a combination of categories is applied. The homogeneity test involves the null 
hypothesis ( )0H  that the proportions with certain characteristics in two or more different 
populations are the same. 
 
 
7.1 Avoiding Pitfalls  
 
When doing research it is important to consider the socio-cultural environment such as, 
values, literacy, religion, communications patterns and family. Due to the fact that in many 
developing countries a considerably number of people only has elementary school education. 
A sophisticated interview method may not be useful (Malhotra, 1999). Therefore for this 
study an easy to follow survey was developed. The questionnaire was intended to engage the 
farmers and the elevators and to stimulate their interest in providing complete and accurate 
answers. Even though  a structure of fixed-alternative questions is used the respondents may 
be unable or unwilling to provide the desired information, such as motives, beliefs, feelings 
and information that may be considered as sensitive or personal. Despite of these 
disadvantages these surveys are by far the most common method of primary data collection 
(Malhotra, 1999). In addition as a Mexican, cultural barriers will not be a problem with the 
application of the survey due to the fact that I as a researcher share the same cultural 
background. 
 
There is always a slight risk of fallacy when a researcher realizes on other people to perform 
surveys. But due to the geographical distance it has been necessary to use assistants that can 
distribute and perform the surveys according to my directions. In order to minimize the risk of 
inaccuracies with regards to the surveys, reliable people have been chosen to perform the 
surveys and send them to me. The people in charge to apply the surveys posses a high level of 
reliability since they are people within the agricultural industry and well known to me. 
Therefore I am convinced that no biased behavior will occur to the detriment of the results.   
 
After all the information was processed, both qualitative and quantitative, the results from the 
surveys are collected. Thereafter an analysis of the information is conducted on the basis of 
the chosen theories and the stated hypotheses. Finally a discussion and conclusion is enacted 
in order to answer the questions into problem formulation and fulfill the aim of the research. 
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8 Results 
 
In the following chapter results from the farmers, elevators and banks are presented. The 
farmers’ surveys present results of agricultural, post harvest and financing practices, also their 
perception of the grain receipt system. Thereafter results from the elevators present their 
storage capacity, equipment installed, grain management, their relevance as financial 
intermediaries and their perception of the grain receipt system. In addition the results from the 
banks present the loan portfolio destined to agricultural lending, their perception of the grain 
receipt system and repayment rate among farmers.  
 
 
8.1 Farmers  
 
This study is based on surveys answered by 52 farmers located in the Cienega region. The 
farmers that cooperated to answer the survey are residents as follow; 84% are from Ocotlan, 
7% from Zapotlan del Rey, 7% from Tototlan and 2% from La Barca. (Figure 9)  Their ages 
range from 30 to more than 60 years old. 15% of the farmers are between 30 to 40 years old, 
33% are between 41 to 50 years old, 31% are between 51 to 60 years old and 21% are older 
than 60 years old. (Figure 10) 
 
 
8.1.1 Agricultural Practices 
 
The study reveals that the farmers have been 
growing corn for many decades. 45% of the 
farmers have been growing corn for more than 
30 years. (Figure 11) Most of those farmers 
can be classified as small farmers since they 
grow corn in small pieces of land. 38% of the 
respondents grow corn in between 5 to 15 
hectares. While only 2% grow corn in more 
than 100 hectares. (Figure 12)  
 
County
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15%
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Farmers age
4%
10%
25%
16%
45%
Less than
5
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Years
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Figure 9: Farmers’ County Figure 10: Farmers’ Age 
Figure 11: Farmers experience in growing corn 
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50% of the farmers grow corn on their own land while 13% of the farmers do not own any 
land at all, but they lease land for growing corn. (Figure 13) According to the results from the 
surveys the systems for growing corn are to 71% based on rain-fed conditions while 29% is a 
combination of irrigated systems and rain-fed conditions. (Figure 14) Therefore not a single 
farmer grows corn with only irrigated systems. Moreover the yields are based on tonnes per 
hectare, even knowing that corn’s growing systems are mainly under rain-fed conditions in 
the Cienega region yields are grater than national yields which are 2.8 tonnes per hectare (45 
bushels/acre) (SIAP, 2006). 49% of their yields in the Cienega region are between 6 to 8 
tonnes per hectare (96 bushels/acre to 127 bushels/acre), while 47% are among 8.1 to 10 
tonnes per hectare (129 bushels/acre to 160 bushels/acre) and only 2% have yields greater 
than 10 tonnes per hectare (160 bushels/acre). (Figure 15)  
 
In addition, 73% of the farmers have livestock while the remaining 27% only grow crops 
which may place them in a hazardous position for no being able to diversify. (Fig. 16) 
Furthermore the hectares used for grazing are small. Among the farmers that have livestock 
only 42% destined less than 5 hectares for grazing while 21% of the farmers destined 16 to 30 
hectares for grazing. (Fig. 17) 
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8.1.2 Post Harvest Practices 
Regarding post harvest practices 93% of the farmers deliver their grain to elevators while only 
7% store the grain for own purposes such as livestock feeding. Hence most of the farm 
operations grow corn for cash market (Figure 18) The elevators are spread all over the areas 
but 8% of the respondents do not have an elevator in close proximity of their farm. However 
79% of the farmers answered that they have four elevators close to the production areas. 
(Figure 19) 
  
The most common criterion to market the grain to an elevator is based on price and business 
relations, representing 54% and 19% respectively. (Fig. 20) Among those farmers that have 
business relations, 60% answered that the business relation is based on financing of inputs by 
the elevators. (Fig. 21) 
 
Furthermore, the most important factor for 
farmers when they deliver their grain to the 
elevator is based on price per ton, the time to 
get paid and the financing of inputs, 
representing 44%, 23% and 21% 
respectively. Evidently the financing used is 
crucial to many of the farmers (Figure 22) 
 
In addition, almost the half of the farmers 
deliver grain to the same elevator each 
harvest season, which means that the farmers 
have a strong dependency of those elevators 
due to the fact that they receive financing 
from them. (Figure 23)  
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Figure 18: Grain allocation after harvest Figure 19: Elevators in farmers’ area 
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Figure 23: Delivering the grain to the same elevator 
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Regarding elevators’ reputation from the following scale “disappointed, indifferent and 
exceptional” 79% of the farmers are indifferent. While 8% are disappointed and only 10% 
feel that the reputation is exceptional. (Figure 24)  In addition when the farmers where asked 
about the reputation of the elevator where they deliver their grain 52% answered that they are 
mostly satisfied while 6% are not satisfied and 13% are very satisfied. (Figure 25)  
 
The study reveals that the main problems that farmers face once they have delivered grain to 
elevators are; low prices and cheating, representing 37% and 28% respectively. (Figure 26) 
Moreover farmers’ satisfaction with the elevators’ quality measurements show that only 8% 
are very satisfied, 35% are mostly satisfied, 47% are somewhat satisfied and 10% are not 
satisfied. (Figure 27) 
 
Furthermore, after the farmers delivered the grain, 6% of the farmers receive the payment 
after 2 working days, 27% have to wait between 1 to less than 2 weeks to get paid, 13% wait 
between 3 to 4 weeks, 21% have to wait between 1 to 2 months to receive the payment, and 
finally 6% have to wait more than 2 months to get paid. (Figure 28) Regarding the long period 
of time until payment 60% of the farmers have at least once experienced one month or more 
of delay to receive their payment. (Figure 29)  
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Once the farmers are paid, 75% answered that they receive the payment all at once, while 
25% receive partial payments. (Figure 30) In addition, farmers were asked about how they 
allocate their cash after being paid. 51% destined their cash income to pay debt obligations, 
37% use their cash for livelihood and only 12% use their cash to buy inputs for the next 
growing season. (Figure 31) Moreover when farmers were asked if they were satisfied with 
their financial income, 56% answered that they are not satisfied while only 2% are very 
satisfied. (Figure 32) 
 
 
When farmers were asked what is affecting their 
satisfaction of the financial outcome, 43% 
answered high input prices, 38% answered low 
grain prices at harvest time and 18% answered 
high interest rates on loans.  (Figure 33) 
Therefore they were asked when they buy their 
inputs and 85% buy the inputs when they really 
need them and only 15% buy them in advance. 
(Figure 34)  
 
The fact that farmers have to wait a long period of time to be paid and low grain prices after 
harvest are some of the reasons that farmers are adversely affected in their profits and 
financial satisfaction. Farmers are not able to buy inputs in advance because as soon as they 
have an income they have to allocate that income first paying debt obligations, secondly 
livelihood and last, if is money left buy inputs in advance which may be unlikely to happen. 
Hence farmers face high input prices and low grain prices which place them in a cycle of low 
profitability. 
 
 
75%
25%
All at once Partial payments
How is your payment?
51%
12%
37%
Pay debt
obligations
Buy inputs for
next season
Livelihood
What do you do with your cash?
56%
30%
12%
2%
Not
satisfied
Somewhat
satisfied
Mostly
satisfied
Very
satisfied
Economic outcome
38%
43%
18%
Low prices at
harvest time
High inputs
prices
High interest
rates on loans
Affecting satisfaction Time to buy inputs
In advance  
15%
When are need 
them  85%
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8.1.3 Financing Practices 
Concerning financing practices 77% of the farmers indicated that they have a need for 
external financing while 23% answered that they are not in need of external financing. (Figure 
35)  Therefore, for the ones that are in need of external financing, they were asked how they 
solve their working capital needs. The answers were that 83% solve their working capital 
needs from the informal credit sector such as friends, family or elevator, while only 18% are 
able to solve their working capital needs through the formal sector such as banks. (Figure 36)  
 
 
Furthermore, when were asked if they have received credit from the Rural Financial Bank10 
then 71% reveal that they never received credit from the Rural Financial Bank while only 8% 
answered that they always have been receiving credit from that bank. (Figure 37) Besides that 
credit to the agricultural sector is restricted the Rural Financial Bank is fairly new that may be 
a reason of why farmers have not receive credit from that bank. Moreover farmers have 
experienced problems when applying for a loan from formal institutions. Those problems 
were awkward procedures, lack of collateral, high interest rates and previously indebted, with 
44%, 29%, 25% and 1% respectively. (Figure 38) In addition, 47% of the farmers answered 
that they do not have enough collateral to offer to the bank, while 43% have plenty collateral 
to offer to the bank when applying asking for a loan. 
 
Concerning collaterals, 96% of the farmers have never used their grain as collateral. (Figure 
39) This fact may provide an interest for farmers to use a grain receipt system  Therefore the 
61% answered that the most desirable collateral for banks is the land were farmers grow their 
crops. (Figure 40) On the other hand some farmers are not able to use their land as collateral 
due legal constraints. 
                                                
10
 The Rural Financial Bank is a well known bank in Mexico as “Financiera Rural”  www.financierarural.gob.mx  
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Furthermore 49% of the farmers have to visit the bank more than 5 times before the loan is 
granted, while only 4% have to visit the bank only once. (Figure 41) When farmers where 
asked about an assessment of their assets value and the percentage of debt compared with 
their assets value, hence the maximum assets value was 12,000,000 Mexican pesos (MXN) 
(1,101,827 USD – 7,865,503 SEK – FX rate Aug/05/2006), the minimum was 40, 000 MXN (3,673 USD – 
26,218 SEK) and the average was 3, 567, 000 MXN (327, 518 USD – 2,338,020 SEK). (Figure 42)  
 
The percentage of debt obligation in relation to asset value indicated a maximum of 33%. The 
average was estimated to 24% with a minimum of was no debt at all. Hence the farmers are 
not over indebted compared to the estimated value of their assets. Moreover 85% of the 
farmers have always succeeded in fulfilling their debt obligations while the 10% have never 
repaid their loans and the remaining 5% sometimes have defaulted. In order to fulfill their 
working capital needs the farmers were asked if they are interested in using grain as collateral. 
Surprisingly 56% of the farmers are not interested while 46% showed some kind of interest. 
(Figure 43) In addition 42% of the farmers revealed a reasonable level of interest for hedging 
prices.  (Figure 44)  
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8.1.4 Perceptions of Grain Receipts  
Regarding grain receipts and the associated mechanisms, 62% of the farmers are not 
interested in using different elevators, while 48% are somewhat interested. (Figure 45)  The 
same behavior is observed in terms of paying storage cost and interest in hedging. (Figure 46)  
 
Consequently, the farmers’ interest in a Grain Receipt System is divided where 56% are not 
interested at all while 44% showed some level of interest. (Figure 47) On the other hand when 
farmers where asked if they were interested to improve their agricultural practices to improve 
grain quality, knowing that their grain could be used as collateral, 83% of the farmers are in 
someway interested while only 17% are not interested at all. (Figure 48)  
 
Moreover the farmers have to some extent foreseen some of the problems in a Grain Receipt 
System. The 31% perceived the problem of interest rates, a 30% awkward procedures, 26% 
risk of falling prices while 9% storage cost and 3% long distance for carry the grain. (Figure 
49) Consequently 56% of the farmers do not consider a GRS as a risk management strategy 
but 52% of the farmers acknowledge that a GRS has benefits in the long run. (Figures 50, 51)     
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8.2 Elevators 
 
The elevators are located in the counties where the interviewed farmers come from. The 
answers are based on five counties 7 interviewed elevators out of 20 that are scattered into the 
areas of where corn is produced. Their storage capacity differs according to their capabilities. 
The storage capacity is on average 18,000 metric tons unit a minimum 8,000 and a maximum 
45,000 metric tons capacity. The elevators represent a storage capacity of 126,000 metric 
tons. (Figure 52) Counting the storage capacity of the elevators with the corn yields of 7 tons 
per hectare, the elevators may have the capability to cover 18,000 hectares approximately 
which approximately is 4% of the total size of the Cienega region. The elevators play an 
important role among farmers due to the fact that most of them offer credit to the farmers. 
This may be the reason that some farmers do not have the willingness to select a new elevator 
due to the fact that the current elevator is providing him with financing (Figure 53) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The elevators are indifferent to receive 
grain either from bigger scale farmers or 
from small scale farmers. Hence no 
decision making problem appears to affect 
to the selection of bigger or small scale 
farmers. On the other hand when the 
elevators are asked if they are interested in 
a GRS 57% are not interested at all while 
the remaining 43% are at to some extend 
level interested. (Figure: 54) This 
perception may be because the elevator currently has the bargaining power of take it or leave 
it to the farmers. In addition the elevator as a financial intermediary has the knowledge of the 
farmers that are more reliable. Therefore the elevator may not have the willingness to end the 
business relation with those farmers.  
 
Of the elevators that express an interest in GRS most of them are interested to obtain a license 
to become a part of the GRS. (Figure 55)  In addition 71% of the elevators are at some point 
interested in offering hedging services. (Figure 56) All the elevators are interested in issuing 
receipts that specify quality, quantity and place. Surprisingly all the elevators are interested in 
receiving inspections without previous announcement. The willingness of the elevators to be 
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inspected without previous announcement may show that currently the interviewed elevators 
may operate transparently. Besides all the elevators always apply quality standards, such as 
14% of moisture in the grain at harvest time and corn with broken kernels or with foreign 
material is accepted but with penalties.  
 
Regarding facilities and grain management, all the elevators store the grain in warehouses and 
besides 14% employ a temporal grain management in outdoor piles. All of the elevators have 
telephone, computers and moisture detector. (Figure 57) In addition, are interested to develop 
a database of farmers with information such as, yield per hectare, inputs used, and agricultural 
practices. Moreover 86% are likely to improve their grain management skills with a GRS and 
are interested to invest in the required equipment and also interested in being synchronized 
with the bank in order to provide information from farmers. In addition, all the elevators 
manifested at some point that is likely that farmers improve their agricultural practices within 
a GRS. (Figure 58)  
 
 
8.3 Banks 
 
The interviewed banks belong to the private and public sector which provides a broad picture 
on how financial intermediaries view a GRS. The public bank mainly focuses on development 
and as the principal it strives to accomplish the financial support for the agricultural sector 
and its financial support system that may be replicated by the private banks.  
 
The private banks plan to increase lending to the agricultural sector, due to the facts provided 
by the interviewed banks the agricultural sector represents an important share for it income. 
14%
29%
57%
0%
Not interested
Somew hat
interested
Interested
Very interested
Figure 55: Elevators interested to obtain a license
29%
43% 100%
71%
100%71%
86%
100%
Grain Dryer
Pneumatic Probe Truck Sampler
Humidity Detector
Grading Devices
Computer
Internet
Fax
Telephone
Figure 57: Elevators' equipment
0%
29%
43%
0%
29%
Not likely at all
2
3
4
Very likely
Figure 58: How likely do yo think that farmers improve their agricultural 
practices with a GRS?
29%
14%
57%
0%
Not
interested
Somew hat
interested
Mostly
interested
Very
interested
Figure 56: Elevators Interested in 
offering services of hedging
 41 
Out of the total of loan portfolio of the banks, only between 20% and 30% is destined to 
agricultural lending. However the repayment rate among farmers to banks is estimated 
between 90% and 100%. Therefore the banks label the farmers a moderate level of risk.  
 
Regarding the GRS all of the banks are interested or very interested in participating in a GRS. 
In addition all of them are very satisfied with the grain as collateral. Moreover if the banks 
realize that is likely that the farmer defaults then the banks are owners of the grain. Hence for 
that case the banks are interested in hedging. It is more convenient that farmers hedge since 
they are the owners of the grain before due date of repayment and may have the commitment 
to meet their debt obligations. Hence if the bank plays the hedge, but the farmer does not 
default, then the bank is not hedging anymore is speculating which may not be convenient for 
the banks. Concerning the cost of monitoring the banks perceive that monitoring of farmers is 
likely to decrease within a GRS. In terms of establishing relationships with elevators in order 
to receive complete information regarding farmers’ grain, the banks were at some point likely 
to consider this option. On the other hand when the banks were asked if they would like to 
invest in smart cards and install ATMs at the elevators to make it easier for farmers to get 
access to cash, none of the banks were willing to do it.  
 
In addition, the banks view that with a GRS their skills in providing inventory credits will 
improve, because their staff becomes familiar with the system and enhances their knowledge 
by practicing. More importantly, the banks considered it as likely that with a GRS credits for 
farmers become more affordable since collateral is easy to trade and monitoring cost decrease. 
Moreover the banks are willing to lend 80% of the total value of the corn within a GRS 
keeping the remaining 20% as warranty to cover administrative cost or falling corn prices in 
case the farmer fail in meeting debt obligation. In addition the banks answered that the 
frequently imposed informational requirements from farmers when they borrow at the bank 
are; yields per hectare, not being previously indebted, inputs used and agricultural practices.  
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9 Analysis and Discussion  
 
The following chapter addresses the questions stated in the problem formulation from chapter 
1. Additionally the results and the theory will be connected and also applying the hypothesis 
mentioned in chapter 6.   
 
 
9.1 Farmers 
 
When farmers act as principals they are likely to accomplish improved access to financial 
support and to enhance their quality of life and financial perception. Hence it is important to 
examine if the farmers from the Cienega are a homogenous group regarding their financial 
perception, of the net income that they receive after marketing their crops. Therefore a test of 
homogeneity with a 5% of significance level was performed in order to test the null 
hypothesis ( )0H  of the distribution of farmers with respect than financial perception, such as 
satisfaction or dissatisfaction, is similar across the counties of Ocotlan, Tototlan, Zapotlan de 
Rey and La Barca. The test is intended to examines the perception among farmers (Table 3)  
 
The statements of hypothesis are; ( )0H  the proportions of farmers that belong to each 
financial perception are the same in all counties. ( )1H  The proportions of farmers that belong 
to each financial perception are not the same in all counties.  
 
Table 3: Financial perception among the counties    
      
 COUNTIES  
FINANCIAL SATISFACTION Ocotlan Tototlan Zapotlan del 
Rey 
La Barca Total 
Not satisfied 24 2 1 1 28 
Satisfied 18 2 3 1 24 
Total 42 4 4 2 52 
      
Results     
Critical Value 7.814724703         
Chi-Square Test Statistic 1.558673469         
Degrees of Freedom 3         
Level of Significance 0.05         
 
The value of test statistics 2χ = 1.5 is less than the critical value of 2χ = 7.8 and falls in the 
non-rejection region. Hence we fail to reject the null hypothesis ( )0H and conclude that the 
distribution of farmers with respect to financial perceptions seems to be similar across the 
counties of Ocotlan, Tototlan, Zapotlan del Rey and La Barca. Therefore the farmers in the 
Cienega may be considered a homogenous group regarding financial satisfaction or 
dissatisfaction, according to the net income received.  
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9.1.1 Control Problem 
The farmers’ decision making of choosing an elevator for delivering the grain is mainly based 
on the highest offered price or be granted of financial support. Moreover the farmers face the 
problem of cheating, considered as one of the main problems when the grain is delivered. 
Even thought cheating is one of the main problems, 62% of the farmers are not interested to 
change elevator. In addition to the problem, only 6% of the farmers are not satisfied with the 
reputation of their current elevator. This behavior may be related with the fact that if a higher 
price is paid or if financial support is granted then cheating is forgiven. Thereby the farmers 
have the control problem due to the fact that they may become unwillingly attached to a 
specific elevator. The reason is that the farmers cannot freely decide where to deliver their 
grain because the elevator provides credit. Therefore the farmers feel forced to deliver their 
grain to that elevator even knowing that its reputation is not as good as they ideally would 
expect. Hence a hypothesis test is applied in order to examine if there is any association 
between the perceptions that farmers have concerning the elevators’ reputation and the 
willingness to try new elevators. (Table 4)  
 
Table 4: Relationship between elevators' reputation and willingness of try new elevator 
    
  TRY NEW ELEVATOR   
ELEVATORS' REPUTATION Not Interested Interested Total 
Disappointed 2 2 4 
Indifferent 27 14 41 
Exceptional 3 4 7 
Total 32 20 52 
      
Results     
Critical Value 5.991476357   
Chi-Square Test Statistic 1.579703833   
Degrees of Freedom 2   
Level of Significance 0.05   
 
The null hypothesis ( )0H can not be rejected with a 5% level of significance. Consequently 
there is not statistically significant evidence since the value of test statistic 2χ = 1.5 is less 
than the critical value 2χ =5.9 Hence, the result indicates that among farmers there is no 
association between the elevators’ reputation and the tendency to try new elevators. Thereby 
the farmers are indifferent regarding elevators’ reputation and may consider the business 
relation of financial support more important than elevators’ reputation. Therefore the lack of 
financial support places the farmers in a vulnerable position where they are unwillingly 
accepting cheating in order to be granted of financial support. With a GRS the farmers may be 
unattached to a specific elevator since they can freely choose the most reliable elevator for 
delivering the grain.   
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9.1.2 Horizon Problem 
The surveys reveal no horizon problem among the farmers. For instance 87% of the farmers 
are willing to improve their agricultural practices with a grain receipt system. Therefore a test 
of independence is conducted in order to examine if is any relation between years of 
experience and the willingness to invest in improvements of agricultural practices. (Table 5)  
 
Table 5: Relationship between years growing corn and improving agricultural practices 
 IMPROVING AGRICULTURAL PRACTICES  
YEARS GROWING CORN Not Interested Interested Total 
< 10  2 5 7 
11 - 20 1 12 13 
21 - 30 3 7 10 
> 30 4 18 22 
Total 10 42 52 
    
Results   
Critical Value 7.814724703     
Chi-Square Test Statistic 2.269734075     
Degrees of Freedom 3     
Level of Significance 0.05     
 
There is no statistically significant evidence since the value of test statistic 2χ = 2.2 is less 
than the critical value 2χ =7.8 Hence the null hypothesis is not rejected. Consequently there is 
no relation between years of growing corn and the willingness of improving agricultural 
practices. Hence for farmers the age is not a problem for improvements. Furthermore, no 
association is found between farmers’ age and the financial needs. Either young or old 
farmers face financial needs. Moreover no association was found either between farmers’ age 
and the perception of financial satisfaction according to the net income criterion.(Appendix 2)  
 
Among the Cienega corn producers their financial satisfaction is adversely affected due to low 
corn prices at harvest time and high input prices. In terms of farmers’ perception 46% are 
interested on using grain as collateral. Therefore, in order to analyze the impact of age 
diversity among farmers a test of statistical independence between age and interest expressed 
to use grain as collateral was conducted. The test reveals no association as well due to the fact 
that the value of test statistic 2χ = 0.87 is less than the critical value 2χ =7.8 Hence the null 
hypothesis could not be rejected. Therefore for farmers their age not affect the willingness of 
using grain as collateral, thereby no horizon problem is present for farmers. (Table 6)  
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Table 6: Relationship between farmers' age and interest of using grain as collateral 
 GRAIN AS COLLATERAL  
FARMERS' AGE Not Interested Interested Total 
30 - 40 4 4 8 
41 - 50 8 8 16 
51 - 60 10 6 16 
> 60 7 4 11 
Total 29 22 51 
Results   
Critical Value 7.814724703     
Chi-Square Test Statistic 0.873860074     
Degrees of Freedom 3     
Level of Significance 0.05     
 
In terms of the elevators as agents 86% of them indicate that they are likely to improve their 
grain management with a grain receipt system. In addition all of the interviewed elevators are 
willing to build a farmers database with information concerning, yields per hectare and inputs 
used since these information is required from banks to provide credit to farmers. Moreover 
86% of the elevators are willing to be synchronized with a bank, providing information from 
farmers, and to conduct required investments in order to be a part of a grain receipt system. 
Therefore the elevators that agree with the concept of GRS are not facing horizon problem. 
Hence, for 46% of the farmers and for 43% of the elevators that that indicate that they are 
interested in a grain receipt system, the horizon problem does not appear to affect the 
feasibility of a GRS. On the other hand the remaining part of farmers and elevators are simply 
not being interested in joining the system. The lack of interest of using the grain as collateral 
may be related to the desperate need of cash after harvest and receiving the total market value 
of the corn and not a percentage as is mentioned in the GRS.  
 
9.1.3 Portfolio Problem 
Most of the farmers are involved in the cash market since 93% of the farmers deliver the grain 
right after harvest to the elevators. Furthermore besides growing corn 73% of the farmers 
diversify their agricultural activities with livestock and the remaining 27% produce only corn. 
Hence the farmers that produce only one crop are facing more risk since they only depend of 
the income of growing corn and are not able to diversify. Regarding the farmers that operate 
livestock, 42% allocate less than 5 hectares for grazing but only 7% store grain for livestock 
feeding. The reason that most of the farmers are involved in the cash market and delivering 
the grain right after harvest may be related to the desperate need of cash. Since most of the 
farmers allocate their income to pay debt obligations, therefore they are not able to buy inputs 
in advance. Therefore the farmers are not satisfied since the inputs are too costly and grain 
prices are low.  
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Despite the fact that most of the farmers diversify their agricultural activities through 
livestock it is not enough to improve their income due to the fact that they usually sell the 
grain when prices usually are the lowest. Therefore when they need grain to feed their 
livestock they may have to buy the grain at a higher price compared to when they sold it. This 
situation causes the farmers to either buy the grain at a higher price or to feed their livestock 
with a poor feed ration. Therefore irrespectively of the selection the farmers are adversely 
affected. Hence the current situation of lack of facilities to store the grain and not being able 
manage price risk place the farmers in a portfolio problem.  
 
A way to mitigate risk is with a grain receipt system since 46% of the farmers consider the 
GRS as a risk management strategy and 42% are interested in hedging while the grain is 
stored. Therefore a test is conducted between farmers that have livestock and express an 
interest in hedging. (Table 7) 
 
Table 7: Relationship between farmers’ interest in hedging and having livestock 
 LIVESTOCK  
HEDGING No Yes Total 
Not Interested 5 25 30 
Interested 10 12 22 
Total 15 37 52 
Results   
Critical Value 3.841455338     
Chi-Square Test Statistic 5.124761125     
Degrees of Freedom 1     
Level of Significance 0.05     
 
According to the results the test statistic of 2χ = 5.12 exceeds the critical value of 2χ = 3.84 
Hence the null hypothesis is rejected and there appears to exist an association between 
farmers that have livestock and the interest in hedging. This may be related because farmers 
that have livestock face the future need to buy grain to feed their livestock at higher price. In 
addition, a positive relationship is found in the interest in hedging and interest in using grain 
as collateral (Table 8)  
 
Table 8: Relationship between interested in hedging and interested in using grain as 
collateral 
  GRAIN AS COLLATERAL   
HEDGING Not Interested Interested Total 
Not Interested 21 9 30 
Interested 8 14 22 
Total 29 23 52 
Results 
  
Critical Value 3.841455338 
  
Chi-Square Test Statistic 5.821561946 
  
Degrees of Freedom 1 
  
Level of Significance 0.05 
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The results from the test statistic of 2χ = 5.82 exceeds the critical value of 2χ = 3.84 Hence 
the null hypothesis is rejected and there appears to exist an association between the interest of 
hedging and using grain as collateral. This may be explained because the farmers that want to 
use their grain as collateral are interested in hedging corn prices to mitigate the risk of falling 
prices and being able to fulfill debt obligations from the loan granted. In addition a positive 
relation between interested in hedging and willingness to pay storage costs. (Table 9) 
 
Table 9: Relationship between hedging and willingness to pay storage cost 
  
STORAGE COST   
HEDGING Not Interested Interested Total 
Not Interested 28 2 30 
Interested 6 16 22 
Total 34 18 52 
Results 
  
Critical Value 3.841455338 
  
Chi-Square Test Statistic 24.47264805 
  
Degrees of Freedom 1 
  
Level of Significance 0.05 
  
 
According to the results the test statistic of 2χ = 24.47 exceeds the critical value of 2χ = 3.84 
Hence the null hypothesis is rejected and there appears to exist an association between interest 
of hedging and willingness to pay storage cost. Hence the farmers that are interested in 
hedging are willing to pay storage cost which means that farmers are acquainted with the 
carrying charges involved in the grain receipt system. Consequently a positive relation 
between hedging and considering GRS as a risk management strategy. (Table 10) 
 
Table 10: Relationship between GRS as a risk management strategy and interested in 
hedging 
  
Interested in Hedging 
  
Grain Receipts as a Risk Strategy Not Interested Interested Total 
Not Considered 25 3 28 
Considered 5 19 24 
Total 30 22 52 
Results 
  
Critical Value 3.841455338 
  
Chi-Square Test Statistic 24.80880231 
  
Degrees of Freedom 1 
  
Level of Significance 0.05 
  
 
According to the results the test statistic of 2χ = 24.80 exceeds the critical value of 2χ = 3.84 
Hence the null hypothesis is rejected and there appears to exist an association between the 
consideration of GRS as a risk management strategy and interest in hedging. Hence the 
farmers that are interested in hedging are acquainted with the GRS as a method of manage the 
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risk of falling prices. Furthermore the interest in hedging may be related to the uncertainty 
that farmers face each season when they do not know the price of the corn. These positive 
relations may be related because farmers face the need to cover risk exposure on corn prices 
since low prices is one of the problems that affect adversely their financial perception.  
 
On the other hand no association was found between financial satisfactions and yields. 
(Appendix 3) For these farmers the desire yield level does not have an impact on financial 
satisfaction due to the fact that the Cienega province is considered the most productive area in 
the state of Jalisco regarding corn production. Therefore the farmers are more concerned of  
the price of the corn and high input prices rather than yields since they know that their yields 
are higher compared to other areas of Mexico. Another reason could be that they may be 
previously indebted from the informal sector which locks them in a low profitability cycle. 
Moreover no association was found either between financial satisfaction and paying storage 
services. The financial perception and interest in paying storage services are not related may 
be because farmers may be convinced about the benefits of the GRS. Therefore their financial 
dissatisfaction is not a constraint to cover the storage cost.   
 
In addition a test is conducted between size of the farm and farmers’ interest in hedging. 
According to the results the test statistic 2χ = 1.46 is less than the critical value 2χ =3.84 
Hence, the null hypothesis can not be rejected. Therefore the size of the farm and farmers’ 
interest in hedging appears not to be related. Even though big size farmers are commonly 
taken for granted to use risk management strategies more extensively, since they are exposed 
to big losses. For big size corn producers from the Cienega province, the fact that they are not 
related with the interest of hedging may be because currently hedging is not generally used. 
Therefore large farms have not been able to grasp hedging benefits. On the other hand the 
farmers interested in the GRS are also interested in hedging since with a GRS the farmers 
become aware of cover price risk exposure. (Table 11)  
 
Table 11: Relationship between the size of the farm and farmers' interest in hedging 
Observed Frequencies 
 Interested in Hedging  
Hectares planted No interested Interested Total 
< 15 20 11 31 
> 15 10 11 21 
Total 30 22 52 
Results   
Critical Value 3.841455338     
Chi-Square Test Statistic 1.464413722     
Degrees of Freedom 1     
Level of Significance 0.05     
 
Therefore the portfolio problem seems to be reduced when introducing the grain receipt 
system since the system fosters the use of hedging strategies when corn is stored. 
Furthermore, 71% of the elevators are interested at some point in offering hedging services or 
information about hedging methods. It is important to notice that with a grain receipt system 
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the risk is not eliminated. Instead, the risk is just to be shared to a larger extent between the 
stakeholders in order to facilitate financing to farmers and to reduce income variation.    
 
9.1.4 Decision Making Problem 
Farmers face low prices as price takers since they sell grain at the offered price. Cheating is 
one of the major problems they face when they deliver the grain to an elevator. Low price is 
an effect of surplus of corn at harvest time and low international prices among others. 
Cheating is difficult to control by the farmers. Although cheating is mentioned as one of the 
main problems, only 10% of the farmers are not satisfied with elevators’ quality 
measurements. The decision by farmers to deliver their grain appears to be mainly based on 
the fact that the elevator is able to provide financial support. Therefore, if financial support is 
granted then cheating seems to be forgiven to some extent. Hence a grain receipt system may 
release the farmers from a cycle of financial support and forgiveness of cheating. One 
explanation is that with a GRS the elevator will only provide storage services and grain 
handling and has no legal interest in the grain unless it is actually sold to the elevator at a 
subsequent period of time. Consequently, with a GRS the farmers’ decision problem in 
selecting an elevator is reduced and therefore they are able to move freely to choose an 
elevator that appears reliable.   
 
 
9.2 Banks 
 
The banks play a crucial role for the success of a GRS. They integrate the farmers into the 
formal credit sector where the need for a functioning legal environment is obvious. Therefore, 
farmers steadily decrease the dependency on the informal credit sector such as landlords, 
elevators, moneylenders, processors or friends.  
 
9.2.1 Control Problem 
Currently 83% of the interviewed corn producers, receive financial support from the informal 
credit sector. Moreover 71% of the corn producers have never received credit from the Rural 
Financial Bank, even though this bank is commonly known as the major provider of financial 
support for the agricultural sector. Consequently many corn producers lack credit history, 
hence the monitoring costs for the banks increase once the bank granted a credit to the corn 
producers. Therefore the banks face a control problem due to the asymmetric information 
among the bank and the corn producers. Additionally the farmers consider the credit 
procedures in the formal credit sector as awkward and time consuming. This may be related to 
the fact that they have to visit the bank several times before the loan is granted accentuates the 
control problem. Hence from data from farmers a test is conducted in order to examine if 
there exists an association between the size of the farm and the number of times that they have 
to visit the bank. (Table 12)  
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Table 12: Hectares used to grow corn & Visit the Bank 
 VISIT THE BANK  
HECTARES FOR GROWING CORN < 3 Times 3 - 5 > 5 Times Total 
5 - 15 2 8 9 19 
16 - 30 3 3 4 10 
> 30 2 6 10 18 
Total 7 17 23 47 
Results    
Critical Value 9.487728465       
Chi-Square Test Statistic 2.61268773       
Degrees of Freedom 4       
Level of Significance 0.05       
 
According to the results the test statistic of 2χ = 2.61 is less than the critical value of 2χ = 
9.48 therefore the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. Consequently, no relationship appears to 
exist between the size of the farm and the number of times that the farmers are required to 
visit the bank. This result may be explained by the fact that for the bank the size is not a 
critical criterion. Instead the size of the farm, the bank may focus on legal tenancy of the land 
and other legal procedures. Moreover, the frequently asked requirements by the banks are; 
yields per hectare, not being previously indebted, agricultural inputs used and agricultural 
practices. In addition, legal tenancy of the land represents information required by the farmer 
who may not be able to keep record of their agricultural practices. Besides, the farmers 
obviously have to fill in the official documents such as contract and legal forms. Considering 
that most of the farmers only have elementary education it is not likely that they feel 
motivated to visit the bank and fill in all the legal documents that are required for a loan. For 
these reasons the farmers consider the procedures as awkward and time-consuming.    
 
Hence the GRS provides a more friendly way to stimulate farmers to integrate into to the 
formal credit sector. Moreover the banks consider at some point of time to work together with 
elevators, who will provide the information that the banks require. Since elevators are well 
acquainted with the farmers, therefore it is easier for them to process the legal documents. 
This is one of the reasons why it is relatively easy for the elevator to get information from 
farmers. Therefore a test is conducted between elevators reputation and interest in the GRS 
from the farmers’ perspective since elevators may gather the required information for the 
banks and to notice if the reputation of the elevators is affecting the farmers’ interest of the 
GRS. (Table 13)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 51 
 
Table 13: Elevators Reputation & Interested in GRS 
 
  Interested in GRS   
Elevators Reputation Not Interested Interested Total 
Not Satisfied 1 3 4 
Satisfied 28 20 48 
Total 29 23 52 
Results 
  
Critical Value 3.841455338   
Chi-Square Test Statistic 1.663168416   
Degrees of Freedom 1   
Level of Significance 0.05   
 
According to the results the test statistic of 2χ = 1.66 is less than the critical value of 2χ = 
3.84 therefore the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. Consequently, no relationship appears to 
exist between the reputation of the elevators and the interest of GRS. Hence for farmers the 
reputation of the elevators not affect their interest in the GRS. Therefore the farmers may be 
indifferent with the elevators regarding the joint forces between the bank and the elevators.   
 
Hence, the banks perceive that monitoring costs will decrease with the grain receipt concept. 
Additionally, the banks expect that their skills in managing credits will improve with a GRS 
since its staff will become familiar with grain as collateral. Therefore the grain receipt system 
seems to mitigate the control problem. Because the asymmetric information with the bank as 
the principal and the farmers as the agents will be reduced, since that the bank only has to 
monitor a few elevators instead of hundreds of farmers.  
 
9.2.2 Portfolio Problem 
Currently the interviewed banks face 10% of the farmers that default on repayments. 
Moreover the banks are constrained to provide credit due to the lack of trustworthy 
collaterals. Hence the banks have a portfolio problem due to the fact that farmers default on 
their loans granted. The grain receipts provide a foundation for using the grain as secure 
collateral and tools such as hedging of price risk and facilitating access to loans for farmers. 
Moreover the interviewed banks are satisfied with grain as collateral. Therefore, tests of 
possible dependence are conducted to notice if farmers with livestock have an influence on 
the tendency to use grain as collateral. However, data from farmers suggest that no 
statistically significant relationship is found between the interest in using grain as collateral 
and having livestock. Therefore the fact that farmers have livestock or not is not related to 
their view on using grain as collateral. Also, no association was found between the variables 
of using grain as collateral and yields. Therefore the variability in yields that farmers face 
each growing season is not associated with the interest in using grain as collateral. 
Irrespecitve of high or low yields farmers may be interested in using grain as collateral. 
(Appendix 4) 
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Furthermore the respondents perceive that with a GRS the credits to farmers are more 
affordable because the collateral is easy to trade and the monitoring costs decrease. 
Consequently, the interviewed banks are interested in stimulating hedging during the period 
that the corn is stored due to the fact that they are the virtual owners until the loan is paid. The 
fact that the respondents appear to be interested in hedging until the loan is paid may place the 
banks in a position as speculators, because if farmers meet debt obligations the bank is no 
longer the owner of the grain. Therefore it is more convenient that the farmers hedge. 
Therefore hedging may become a requirement for farmers. Regarding the amount of credit to 
be granted, the banks are willing to lend 80% of the market value of the corn and the 
remaining 20% to handle the risk of falling corn prices the banks. On the other hand a loan 
may be granted for the 100% of the market value of the grain, because the price of the grain is 
already locked in through hedging. Thereby, the GRS tend to enhance the percentage of the 
loan granted since secure collateral is offered and the bank knows by certainty that the 
repayment of the loan will be fulfilled even if the farmer fails. Hence the GRS mitigate the 
portfolio and the bank may decrease the percentage of default on loan repayments and 
increase their loan portfolio to agricultural lending since secure collateral is provided.  
 
9.2.3 Horizon Problem  
With the GRS the banks require trained staff, invest in information technology systems and 
distribute ATMs to the elevators in order to make access to cash easier. Such investments 
cause a horizon problem. Because the bank as the principal has less incentives in investing in 
smart cards and to distribute ATMs among elevators for the benefit of the farmers. For banks 
agricultural lending just represents the 20% to 30% of their total lending. Moreover, the banks 
consider the farmers at some point as risky in terms of fulfilling debt obligations. Therefore, 
all the banks considered the allocation of ATMs among elevators as an overinvestment. The 
development of smart cards and the lack of internet services within elevators is another 
constraint for the GRS. Hence the horizon problem adversely affects the feasibility of grain 
receipts considerably given the resistance towards the smart card concept and allocation of 
ATMs at elevators. The banks prefer to pay by check instead of using the smart cards concept. 
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9.3 Benefits of the Grain Receipts for the Cienega 
 
The corn producers from the province of the Cienega share the perception that their finances 
are adversely affected by high production costs and low corn prices. Hence the farmers face 
the cycle of low profitability and agency problems. (Figure 59) 
 
The GRS provides a method to unlock the farmers from the low profitability cycle and 
mitigate agency problems. The control problem of the farmers is reduced since the operations 
of the elevator become more transparent and they are less able to cheat thereby reducing the 
asymmetric information between the relationship of farmer and elevator. Although the 
farmers are indifferent to elevators reputation since they are more concern to be provided of 
financial support. Moreover, the willingness of issue receipts with the information required 
reduces the control problem. In addition all the elevators agree to receive inspections without 
previous announcement. Regarding the monitoring costs, the banks perceive a decrease in 
monitoring since with a GRS the banks have to monitor a few elevators instead of hundreds of 
farmers. Therefore the grain receipt system appears to mitigate the control problem that 
farmers face with the elevators and providing freedom to the farmer to select different 
elevators. Moreover the control problem of the bank is reduced as well since the asymmetric 
information between the relationship with the bank and the farmers is reduced due to the 
interaction of sharing information from the elevator to the bank.  
 
For the farmers, horizon problem do not exist. This may contribute to the acceptance of the 
GRS due to the fact that diversity among farmers in terms of age and size of the farm may not 
affect the attitude towards a grain receipt system. Moreover, farmers have willingness to 
invest and innovate considering that they have been growing corn since 30 years or more. 
Hence these farmers may be disposed to do what is necessary in order to improve their 
economic situation. On the other hand the interviewed banks face the horizon problem due to 
Figure 59: The Cycle of Low Profitability 
 
 54 
the fact that they consider as an overinvestment new information technology systems. 
Therefore the GRS is at some point affected by the horizon problem of the banks.    
 
The grain receipt system appears to mitigate portfolio problem. The system fosters the use of 
hedging strategies for price risk when corn is stored. Farmers that only grow one crop and do 
not posses livestock are able to manage the risk in a better way. In addition, the GRS provides 
a more friendly way to engage farmers to integrate into to the formal credit sector since the 
banks are satisfy with the grain as collateral.  
 
The surveys reveal how the farmers are adversely affected because of the lack of purchasing 
power, since they are not able to buy inputs in advance. Consequently they cannot afford high 
quality inputs such as, environmentally friendly pesticides and top quality hybrid seeds. 
Consequently, the farmers feel forced to ask for credit to the informal credit sector. This 
places the farmers in a hazardous position with high interest rates, weak legislation in the 
informal credit sector and the untrustworthy relationship between the farmers and the 
elevator. 
 
Suppliers of agricultural inputs such as pesticides, seeds and fertilizers are affected in their 
sales because of the lack of purchasing power from the farmers. Therefore the suppliers feel 
forced to market cheaper inputs that the farmers can afford even if their yields and the 
environment are negatively affected. Moreover, the suppliers may become a financial 
intermediary to the farmers by providing them credits that should be repaid when farmers 
harvest the crop. These credits include high interest rates, which increase the prices of 
pesticides, seeds and fertilizers. On the other hand the supplier should wait until the farmer 
receives the payment for the crop to fulfill debt obligations. But if the farmer has to wait until 
he is paid for his grain, then high interest rates affect the returns negatively. This places the 
suppliers in risk because the farmer may not fulfill his debt obligation. The farmer may prefer 
to allocate the income for his livelihood rather than to fulfill debt obligations. Hence, a cycle 
of debt is enacted which ultimately may end in a cycle of low profitability or poverty.  
 
Elevators are negatively affected since grain may be poor quality because of low quality seeds 
or poor agricultural practices. In addition, elevators become financial intermediaries to the 
farmer. The elevator can cover a given loan with grain that the farmer delivers to the facilities. 
But if the grain is of poor quality the elevator has to find an alternative market which 
considerably decreases the value of the grain. In addition the farmer may wait long periods of 
time in order to be paid because the elevator may be short of cash. Hence, the income of the 
farmer is negatively affected because the price he receives is when he delivered the grain and 
not when he is paid. The buyers or processors of grain are affected due to a lack of reliable 
suppliers, low productivity or low quality of the grain. Therefore the processors may have to 
find an alternative way to fulfill its demand and may import the grain which may increase 
production costs. The demand for corn is covered by supplies from the international market 
and not by the local farmer, who needs a livelihood.   
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Moreover the quality of corn improves and the processors and livestock feeders will buy the 
grain locally. Hence, imports decreases and competitiveness within the corn supply chain is 
enhanced. In addition the farmer will improve his quality of life. Consequently the farmers 
may feel less forced to migrate to the USA or move to urban areas. Farmers also have a better 
position to adjust with the full liberalization of corn market due to NAFTA. For the elevators 
the problems of being short of cash will be reduced, because they will not buy the grain at the 
time of harvest. They will only provide storage and handling services within the concept of 
GRS. Furthermore the storage infrastructure improves, and post harvest losses decrease. 
Licensed elevators have to operate transparently therefore, becoming reliable elevators in the 
region for the corn supply chain. (Figure 60) 
 
 
The cycle of low profitability place the farmer in a low quality of life and their surroundings 
are placed in an uncompetitive environment. Therefore the GRS contributes towards 
unlocking the farmers from the cycle of low profitability and mitigate agency problems. 
(Figure 61)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 60: Grain Receipt System Effects on the Cienega Region 
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The farmer wants a reliable elevator where he can deliver grain. The bank desires a reliable 
loan applicant that is able to fulfill debt obligations. The effects of the GRS in the Cienega 
province integrate the farmers that lack credit history in the formal credit sector. The risk of 
lending to farmers decreases due to the fact that the corn acts as trustworthy collateral. The 
competitiveness improves due to cost reduction, since the farmers are able to buy top quality 
inputs at lower prices. Hence, the farmer may become proactive and search for 
environmentally friendly pesticides.  
 
 
9.4 Application of Grain Receipts in the Cienega 
 
Access to financing for the agricultural firm is often difficult. Particularly for small farmers 
the credit procedures are both time-consuming and awkward. Therefore many farmers are not 
able to provide the documents that the banks require. Hence it is important to have an easy 
credit system to follow in the Cienega where farmers can get access to credit without 
awkward and time-consuming procedures. Nowadays, information technology (IT) systems, 
such as internet and smart cards, may help to decrease transaction costs and together with 
governments as providers of legislative environments. In the Cienega region about 95% of the 
corn producers have smart cards11 such as DIESEL12 and PROCAMPO13. However such a 
                                                
11
 Smart cards are used to get subsidizes from the Mexican Government. 
12
 Diesel Smart card is used in gas stations to receive discounts on diesel 
Figure 61: Breaking the Cycle of Low Profitability 
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credit system is not constrained only for the use of DIESEL or PROCAMPO’s smart cards. 
The banks together with the elevators may produce a new kind of smart card to the farmers, 
for the use of the grain receipt system. With a new kind of smart card the farmers will not be 
constrained to DIESEL or PROCAMPO cards.  
 
9.4.1 Backup Plan 
A backup plan should be implemented by the government since weather fatalities may happen 
or situations that are out of reach for the banks, farmers, elevators or industry. The Mexican 
Government may use the Natural Disaster Fund Program (FONDEN) to protect the scheme of 
financing by grain receipts.   
 
9.4.2 Monitoring  
Monitoring licensed elevators may be conducted by the Mexican government authorities, such 
as ASERCA14 , PROFECO15 , SAGARPA16 , or Jalisco’s Agricultural Department. Those 
departments may monitor the elevator that is acting as the agent. Consequently the farmer as 
the principal will not have to monitor the agent’s behavior, which reduces the principal’s 
agency cost.  
 
9.4.3 Information System 
Governmental agencies such as ASERCA, SIAP17 and SNIIM18 may provide the information 
about grain prices for a better decision making among farmers, elevators and banks.  
 
9.4.4 Grain Elevators 
Those elevators should be licensed for the grain receipt system, advised and certified on grain 
management by private companies such as ALMER19. Currently there are in the Cienega 
region 50 elevators spread all over the region providing a bridge between corn producers and 
processors. (Appendix 5)   
 
9.4.5 How the Hypothetical Model may Operate 
The involvement of the banks in the elevators’ licensing process is important and previous 
agreements between the elevator and the bank should be accommodated. Therefore the bank 
provides the proper technology to the elevator for data collection and registration with the 
help of smart cards (Figure 62) 
                                                                                                                                                   
13
 Smart card used to receive cash subsidizes based on hectares planted  www.procampo.gob.mx 
14
  Trading Support Services for Livestock and Agriculture – ASERCA www.infoaserca.gob.mx 
15
 Customer Protection Agency – PROFECO www.profeco.gob.mx 
16
 Agricultural, Livestock, Rural Development, Food and Fisheries Department - SAGARPA 
17
 Information System on Agriculture, Food and Fisheries – SIAP www.siap.sagarpa.gob.mx 
18
 Market Information Systems – SNIIM www.economia-sniim.gob.mx 
19
 ALMER private company specialized on grain management www.almer.com.mx 
 58 
 
1. The bank installs the ATM either in the elevator facilities or near to farmers, i.e. in 
rural communities.  
 
2. The farmer delivers the grain to the licensed elevator. The elevator registers 
information details of the grain on the smart card (PROCAMPO or DIESEL) such as 
quality, quantity, location and the quantity of money that the farmer is able to 
withdraw from the ATM, which could be 80% of the total estimated market value of 
the grain, according to the bank’s policy.   
 
3. The farmer goes to the ATM to withdraw money. The smart card is inserted and the 
ATM informs the farmer about the maximum credit that he may receive.  
 
4. Prior to selling grain, the farmer consults with the bank. The farmer sells the grain to 
processors or livestock feeders at the most suitable time or at due date of the 
repayment. The buyer makes an electronic transaction to the elevator; hence the 
elevator covers its storage services and makes a transfer of the remaining amount to 
the bank.  
 
5. Once the loan is paid the bank transfer the remaining amount to the farmer. This cash 
may be taken out from the ATM.   
 
 
 
Figure 62: Grain Receipts Model for the Cienega 
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10 Conclusions 
 
In the Cienega region corn producers are a homogenous group regarding their subjective 
perception of their net income from grain. The majority of the farmers are not satisfied with 
their income. Their explanations are high inputs prices, low corn prices, lack of credit and 
high interest rates. The GRS is likely to reduce several of those problems due to the fact that 
credits will be provided, inputs could be purchased in advance and corn prices could be 
hedged. Moreover awkward lending procedures will be eliminated, engaging the farmers to be 
a part of the formal credit sector. 
 
The GRS is feasible for the Cienega region but perhaps not in the way originally proposed. 
One reason is the banks as principal are exposed to the horizon problem and are not willing to 
invest in smart cards and/or allocate ATMs among the elevators facilities. The banks perceive 
that such investments do not pay off. Hence the banks prefer that the farmers are paid by 
check and force them to visit the bank to complete the formal procedures, which are 
considered as awkward by farmers. Thereby, it remains a strong disincentive in the short run, 
since according to the interviewed banks; the farmers and elevators will not be familiar with 
the system which may contribute towards operational problems. More importantly is that 44% 
and 43% of the farmers and the elevators respectively, agree with the idea of the GRS in the 
way it was proposed. In addition, farmers do not face horizon problems and portfolio and 
control problems are mitigated by the GRS. For the interviewed banks, even if all of them 
favor the proposal of the GRS, they disagreed with the smart card and the ATM concept. The 
bank may have a short term perspective and do not realize that if this concept is replicated in 
the rural areas, the rural communities represent close to 25 million people. Those people need 
the access to financial support without awkward procedures in order to improve their quality 
of life. But private banks are profit oriented. Therefore social development may not be their 
most important priority.  
 
Besides the need of financial credit the Cienga’s corn producers face the opening of markets. 
The ones that grasp the benefits from the free trade agreements are mainly the Mexican 
producers of fruits and vegetables. Hence, the Cienega’s corn producers nowadays are 
fending for themselves when exposed to fierce competition from the USA. For the Cienega’s 
corn producers a switch from corn to fruits and vegetables is complicated since most of those 
farmers have been growing corn for more than 30 years. The production of corn is part of 
their specialization and lifestyle. Therefore it is not likely that the region with the highest 
yields on corn in Mexico during the spring, will change of agricultural practices from one day 
to another, or era be feasible.  In addition, the Cienega is a region where production is mainly 
under rain-fed conditions. Therefore the lack of irrigation systems and infrastructure are 
evident and represent a constraint for the production of fruits and vegetables. Consequently 
what is more feasible for Cienega’s corn producers: providing the irrigation systems, 
infrastructure and training to fruits and vegetables production or to facilitate financial support 
to specialized corn producers and their current infrastructure to the benefit of the corn supply 
chain? 
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The results of this study reveal that there is a need for the development of a strong financial 
support program for Cienega corn producers. Such program should include information 
technologies that decrease the transaction costs and improve the data management. Thereby, 
farmers just need to get access to new technologies such as smart cards in this case. It may be 
just a matter of time before the farmers get used to such a new system. Nowadays the 
Cienega’s corn producers are quite familiar with smart cards, which are used to receive a 
price discount on diesel. Therefore the real challenge is not really the farmers’ familiarization 
with information technology. The real challenge is to find banks that are interested in 
developing a system which is easy to accommodate by the farmers of the Cienega.   
 
 
10.1 Suggestions for Further Studies 
 
There is a need to conduct a study that examines to what extent the application of the GRS is 
financially feasible. The study ought to include: the impact on corn production cost, storage 
cost, forecasting of corn prices, interest rates and the cost of hedging. Furthermore an analysis 
could be made of welfare economic effects of the Mexican government providing subsidies to 
the Cienega’s corn producers. These subsidies may cover the storage cost and hedging, 
thereby making the GRS more affordable and profitable for corn producers. Hence a financial 
study should include two scenarios with and without subsidies. Moreover a financial study 
could be made in order for the banks to realize that the investment in smart cards and 
allocation of ATMs may actually pay off in the long run and be justified privately as well as 
from a social economic perspective. This could be of interest since the proposed grain receipt 
system is constrained by a horizon problem originating in the banks. 
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Appendix 1      
 
FARMERS’ SURVEY 
 
How old are you? 
 
30 – 40 
41 – 50 
51 – 60 
above of 60  
 
How long have you been growing 
corn?  
 
less than 5 years 
5 – 10 years 
11 – 20 years 
21 – 30 years 
more than 30 years 
 
Besides growing corn do you have 
livestock?  
Yes 
No 
 
If previous is answered as “YES” what 
kind of livestock do you have and how 
m any? 
 
Cattle  
     Beef 
     Dairy 
Chicken 
     Hen 
     Broiler 
Pigs 
     Porker 
     Piglets 
Sheep 
 
How m any hectares do you use for 
grazing?  
 
less than 5 
5 – 15 
16 – 30 
31 – 50 
51 – 100 
more than 100 
 
How many hectares do you use for 
growing corn? 
 
less than 5 
5 – 15 
16 – 30 
31 – 50 
51 – 100 
m ore than 100 
 
Where do you grown corn?  
Ocotlán 
Zapotlán del Rey  
Tototlán  
Jamay 
La Barca 
 
Do you own or lease the land?  
Own 
If both, how m any? 
     _____ 
Lease 
If both, how m any? 
     _____ 
 
How do you grow the corn? 
Irrigated system  
How many? 
     ______ 
Rain feed condition 
How many   
     ___ 
What is your yield per hectare 
(average) (tons/ha)? 
less than 6 
6 – 8 
8 – 10 
m ore than 10 
 
What do you do with your grain after 
harvest? 
Sell it to a grain elevator or 
processor 
Store for own use 
Store and wait for higher 
prices 
Date: month  ______________    day __ __     year ______ Survey code:      
 
Nam e: (optional)       
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What percentage of your grain do you 
sell?  
 
       
0 20 30 50 70 90 100 
 
Which criteria do you use to deliver 
the grain to an elevator? (mark only 
one) 
Proximity 
Price 
Service 
Business relation 
 
If your grain is delivered in business 
relationship criteria, what kind of 
relationship is it?  
Inputs financing 
Financing when is need it 
Payment at once 
Reliability 
Tradition  
  
What would you consider as the most 
important to deliver your grain to an 
elevator? (classify from 1 as the most 
important to 5 as the less important) 
___ Inputs financing 
___ Price per ton 
___ Proximity 
___ Reputation 
___ Time to get paid 
 
How many grain elevators do you have 
near to your production area (1/2 hour 
driving loaded)?  
 
      
 
Do you deliver your grain to the same 
elevator every season? 
yes 
no 
If NOT, why? 
 Diversification 
 Try new elevators  
 Deterioration of the 
relationship 
 
How is the general reputation of the 
grain elevators in your area? (1 as the 
less to 5 as the most)  
 
 
       -                                   + 
 
1 2 3 4 
 
5 
Disappointed    Exceptional 
 
What is your general impression of 
your grain elevator’s service? (1 as 
the less to 4 as the most)  
 
 
     -                                      + 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
Not 
satisfied 
Somewhat 
satisfied 
Mostly 
satisfied 
Very 
satisfied 
 
After you deliver the grain, normally 
how long it takes to get paid for? 
48 hours 
1 – 2 weeks 
2 – 3 weeks 
3 – 4 weeks 
1 – 2 months 
more than 2 months 
 
 Have you ever experienced long 
periods of time to get paid for your 
grain? (one month or more)  
No 
Yes 
How long?  
      
 
How do you receive your payment? 
All at once 
Partial payments 
 
What are the main problems that you 
face when deliver the grain to an 
elevator? (mark as many as needed) 
Time-consuming unloading the 
trucks 
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Cheating on weighing and 
sampling 
Rough roads  
Low prices 
Other 
      
 
How is your perception on 
warehouses’ quality measurements? 
 
     -                                      + 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
Not 
satisfied 
Somewhat 
satisfied 
Mostly 
satisfied 
Very 
satisfied 
 
After you get paid for your grain, what 
do you do with your cash? (classify 
from 1 as the most to 4 as the less) 
 
__  Pay debt obligations 
__  Buy inputs for next season 
__  Livelihood 
__  Other 
 
Are you satisfied of the economic 
outcome of growing corn? (1 as the 
less to 4 as the most)  
 
 
     -                                      + 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
Not 
satisfied 
Somewhat 
satisfied 
Mostly 
satisfied 
Very 
satisfied 
 
 
What it is affecting your satisfaction? 
(classify from 1 as the most to 3 as the 
less)  
 
__  Low corn prices at harvest 
time 
__  High inputs prices 
__  High interest on loans 
Do you buy your inputs (seeds, 
pesticides and fertilizers) in advance or 
when are needed?  
In advance  
When are needed 
 
Have you ever faced a situation when 
external financing is needed for 
working capital?  
 
Yes 
No 
 
 
How do you solve your working 
capital needs? 
Asking for a loan to the bank 
Financial sources different than 
banks (what types) 
      
 
 
 
What is the main constraint that you 
face when ask for a loan to the bank? 
(mark more than one if  needed) 
Lack of collateral 
High interest rates 
Previously indebted 
Highly bureaucratic 
procedures  
 
How much is the total value of your 
assets (approximately)? 
 
      
 
Do you have enough collateral to offer 
to the bank?  
Yes, plenty 
Yes, but most of them are 
already used as collateral for 
different activities 
Yes, but they are not 
trustworthy collaterals 
according to the bank 
No, I have not 
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What is the most desirable collateral 
for banks in your area? 
Land 
House 
Machinery 
Farm facilities 
Other 
      
 
What kind of collateral do you 
normally use for a loan?  
Land 
Machinery 
House 
Farm facilities 
Other 
      
 
How many times do you have to visit 
the bank before the loan is given?  
once 
2 – 3 times 
3 – 5 times 
more than 5 
 
What is the percentage of your debt 
obligations compare to your total 
assets? 
 
 
       
0 20 30 50 70 90 100 
 
 
Have you ever used grain as collateral 
when asking for a loan to the bank? 
Yes 
No 
 
If previous question is answered as 
“YES”, have you had problems using 
grain as collateral? 
No 
Yes 
If yes, specify 
      
 
 
 
 
Are you interested to use your grain as 
collateral in order to fulfill your 
working capital needs? (1 as the less to 
4 as the most)  
 
 
     -                                      + 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
Not 
interested 
Somewhat 
interested 
Mostly 
interested 
Very 
interested 
 
Are you interested to deliver your 
grain to an elevator, that have you 
never used or that is not, near to your 
production area in order to use your 
grain as collateral and that elevator 
will issue a receipt specifying quality, 
quantity and location of your grain? (1 
as the less to 4 as the most) 
 
 
     -                                      + 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
Not 
interested 
Somewhat 
interested 
Mostly 
interested 
Very 
interested 
 
Are you interested to store your grain, 
pay storage cost, in order to wait for 
higher prices and decide in what point 
in time is best for sell it? (1 as the less 
to 4 as the most) 
 
 
     -                                      + 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
Not 
interested 
Somewhat 
interested 
Mostly 
interested 
Very 
interested 
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Have you ever received credit from the 
Banks? 
 
     -                                      + 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
Never Seldom Sometimes Always 
 
Have you succeeded fulfilling your 
debt obligations? 
 
 
     -                                      + 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
Never Seldom Sometimes Always 
 
 
Are you interested in a system where 
you can use your grain as collateral to 
fulfill your working capital needs and 
at the same time store your grain for 
higher prices and paying storage cost? 
(1 as the less to 4 as the most) 
 
 
     -                                      + 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
Not 
interested 
Somewhat 
interested 
Mostly 
interested 
Very 
interested 
 
Would you be interested to improve 
your agricultural practices for better 
grain quality, knowing that your grain 
will be used as collateral? (1 as the 
less to 4 as the most) 
 
     -                                      + 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
Not 
interested 
Somewhat 
interested 
Mostly 
interested 
Very 
interested 
 
What problems do you foresee in a 
system where you can use your grain 
as collateral with the Rural Financial 
Bank and store for higher prices with a 
private elevator? (Relevance 
classification, 1 as  the most to 5 as the 
less)  
__  Interest rate of the loan 
__  Bureaucratic procedures 
from bank and elevators 
__  Storage cost 
__  The trucking to a faraway 
elevator 
__  Risk of falling prices 
 
Are you interested to pay hedging to 
lock a floor price to cope with risk 
while the grain is stored? (1 as the less 
to 4 as the most) 
 
 
     -                                      + 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
Not 
interested 
Somewhat 
interested 
Mostly 
interested 
Very 
interested 
 
 
How likely is to consider a grain 
receipt system as a helpful tool for risk 
management strategy?  
 
       -                                   + 
 
1 
2 3 4 
 
5 
Not likely at all    Very likely 
 
 
Do you believe that a grain receipt 
system will be beneficial in the long 
run? 
Yes, I do 
No, I do not   
 
Information that you would like to add 
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ELEVATORS’ SURVEY 
 
How many tons could you store in 
your warehouse?  
      
 
Do you financing inputs to your local 
farmers?  
 
 
       -                                   +  
 
1 
2 3 4 
 
5 
Never    A lways 
 
From the grain that you get from 
farmers near to you, what is the 
percentage of farmers that you offer 
financing? 
 
 
       
0 20 30 50 70 90 100 
 
Are you interested in a grain receipt 
system where farmers can store their 
grain at harvest time in your 
warehouse and keep it until the lean 
season paying you a monthly fee for 
store, load and unload also knowing 
that, that grain will be used as 
collateral to a bank?  
 
 
     -                                      + 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
Not  
Interested 
Somewhat  
Interested 
Mostly 
interested 
Very  
interested 
 
 
 
 
 
Are you interested to store any kind of 
amount of tons even for small (5 
hectares or less) farmers?  
 
 
     -                                      + 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
Not  
Interested 
Somewhat  
Interested 
Mostly 
interested 
Very  
interested 
 
 
W ould you be interested to offer a 
service for hedging to lock a floor 
price to cope with risk while the grain 
is store, once the credit was offered to 
the farmer and now the bank is the 
virtual owner of the grain?  
 
 
     -                                      + 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
Not  
Interested 
Somewhat  
Interested 
Mostly  
Interested 
Very  
interested 
 
 
Do you use quality standards for the 
grain, for instance grading? (Ex. 
humidity, impurity or dust)  
 
 
       -                                   +  
 
1 
2 3 4 
 
5 
Never    Always 
 
Date: month ______________   day __ __     year ______ Survey code:      
 
Bank name: (optional)       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 71 
How is your grain management? (mark 
more than once if needed) 
Warehouse 
 Silo 
Outdoor pile  
 
Dou you have the following equipment 
in your warehouse? 
Grain dryer   
Pneumatic truck probe 
sampler  
Humidity detector 
Grading devices 
Computer 
Internet 
Fax 
Telephone 
 
What are your minimum requirements 
to receive grain from farmers in your 
normal operations?  
 
        
 
Would you be interested to get a 
license in order to be a part of the 
GRS?  
 
 
     -                                      + 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
Not  
Interested 
Somewhat  
Interested 
Mostly 
interested 
Very  
interested 
 
Would you be interested to issue 
receipts to farmers that have been 
storing their grain in your warehouse 
with the following description; quality, 
quantity and place?  
 
 
     -                                      + 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
Not  
Interested 
Somewhat  
Interested 
Mostly 
interested 
Very  
interested 
 
 
Would you be interested to receive 
inspectors without previous 
announcement to check the receipts 
that you are issuing against the tons 
stored and your grain management 
operations?   
 
 
     -                                      + 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
Not  
Interested 
Somewhat  
Interested 
Mostly 
interested 
Very  
interested 
 
 
How likely is that your skills in grain 
management and operations will 
improve with a GRS?  
 
 
       -                                   + 
 
1 2 3 4 
 
5 
Not likely at all    Very likely 
 
 
Would you be interested to build a 
database (yield per hectare, inputs used 
and agricultural practices used) of the 
farmers that decide to store their grain 
in your warehouse? 
 
       -                                   + 
 
1 2 3 4 
 
5 
Not likely at all    Very likely 
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Are you interested to invest in what is 
needed in order to get a GRS license?  
 
     -                                      + 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
Not  
Interested 
Somewhat  
Interested 
Mostly 
interested 
Very  
interested 
 
Are you interested to be synchronized 
with any bank in order to provide it 
farmers’ information that is needed? 
 
     -                                      + 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
Not  
Interested 
Somewhat  
Interested 
Mostly 
interested 
Very  
interested 
  
How likely do you believe that farmers 
will improve their agricultural 
practices of growing corn when grain 
will be used as collateral?  
 
       -                                   + 
 
1 
2 3 4 
 
5 
Not likely at all    Very likely 
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BANKS’ SURVEY 
 
From the total lends that the bank 
offers, what it is the percentage that is 
destined to corn producers? 
 
       
0 20 30 50 70 90 100 
 
What it is the percentage of farmers 
that fulfill debt obligations? 
 
       
0 20 30 50 70 90 100 
 
According to the repayment of debt 
obligations, how do you consider the 
level of risk of lending to corn 
producers? 
 
       -                                   +  
 
1 
2 3 4 
 
5 
Not risk at all    Highly risky 
 
 
Are you interested in a grain receipt 
system where farmers offer their grain 
as collateral to fulfill their working 
capital needs when asking for a loan 
and at the same time the grain is store 
in a reliable warehouse and this grain 
can be used as a repayment if farmers 
fail debt obligation?  
 
 
     -                                      + 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
Not  
Interested 
Somewhat  
Interested 
Mostly 
interested 
Very  
interested 
 
 
 
 
Would you be satisfied with corn grain 
as collateral?  
 
 
     -                                      + 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
Not 
satisfied 
Somewhat 
satisfied 
Mostly 
satisfied 
Very 
satisfied 
 
 
Would you be interested to pay 
hedging to lock a floor price to cope 
with risk while the grain is store, once 
the credit was offered to the farmer and 
now you are the virtual owner of the 
grain?  
 
 
     -                                      + 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
Not  
Interested 
Somewhat  
Interested 
Mostly  
Interested 
Very  
interested 
 
 
Do you think that monitoring farmers’ 
repayment will decrease with a GRS 
rather than without?  
 
 
       -                                   +  
 
1 
2 3 4 
 
5 
Not at all    Very decreasing 
 
Date: month ______________   day __ __     year ______ Survey code:      
 
Bank name: (optional)       
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How likely is that you are working 
together with warehouses to get 
farmers information?  
 
       -                                   + 
 
1 
2 3 4 
 
5 
Not likely at all    Very likely 
 
Would you be interested to join forces 
in information technology (smart 
cards) with a warehouse to improve 
rural credit? 
 
     -                                      + 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
Not  
Interested 
Somewhat  
Interested 
Mostly 
interested 
Very  
interested 
 
 
Would you be interested to install an 
ATM in the warehouse facilities to 
make easier for farmers the access to 
cash?  
 
     -                                      + 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
Not  
Interested 
Somewhat  
Interested 
Mostly 
interested 
Very  
interested 
 
 
How likely is that your skills in 
inventory credit will improve with a 
GRS?  
 
       -                                   + 
 
1 
2 3 4 
 
5 
Not likely at all    Very likely 
 
 
 
 
How likely do you think that within a 
GRS the credits for corn producers will 
be cheaper due to collaterals are easy 
to trade in cash and monitoring is made 
trough warehouses? 
 
 
       -                                   + 
 
1 2 3 4 
 
5 
Not likely at all    Very likely 
 
 
What percentage of collateral’s value 
are you willing to lend to corn 
producers?  
      
 
 
What are the variables that you 
consider when lending money to the 
farmers? (ex. yield per hectare, inputs 
used, agricultural practices, others)  
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Appendix 2 Chi square tests 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FARMERS' AGE & FINANCIAL NEEDS
Calculations
FARMERS' AGE No Yes Total
30 - 40 4 4 8 0.54902 -0.54902
41 - 50 4 12 16 -2.901961 2.901961
51 - 60 9 7 16 2.098039 -2.098039
> 60 5 6 11 0.254902 -0.254902
Total 22 29 51
FARMERS' AGE No Yes Total
30 - 40 3.45098 4.54902 8 0.087344 0.066261
41 - 50 6.901961 9.098039 16 1.220143 0.925625
51 - 60 6.901961 9.098039 16 0.637756 0.483815
> 60 4.745098 6.254902 11 0.013693 0.010388
Total 22 29 51
Level of Significance 0.05
Number of Rows 4
Number of Columns 2
Degrees of Freedom 3
Critical Value 7.814725
Chi-Square Test Statistic 3.445025
p -Value 0.327962
Expected frequency assumption
       is fulfilled.
fo-fe
(fo-fe)^2/fe
FINANCIAL NEEDS
FINANCIAL NEEDS
Data
Results
Do not reject the null hypothesis
Observed Frequencies
Expected Frequencies
FARMERS' AGE & FINANCIAL SATISFACTION
Calculations
FARMERS' AGE Not Satisfied Satisfied Total
30 - 40 7 1 8 2.607843 -2.607843
41 - 50 9 7 16 0.215686 -0.215686
51 - 60 7 9 16 -1.784314 1.784314
> 60 5 6 11 -1.039216 1.039216
Total 28 23 51
FARMERS' AGE Not Satisfied Satisfied Total
30 - 40 4.392156863 3.607843137 8 1.548407 1.885017
41 - 50 8.784313725 7.215686275 16 0.005296 0.006447
51 - 60 8.784313725 7.215686275 16 0.362439 0.44123
> 60 6.039215686 4.960784314 11 0.178826 0.217701
Total 28 23 51
Level of Significance 0.05
Number of Rows 4
Number of Columns 2
Degrees of Freedom 3
Critical Value 7.814724703
Chi-Square Test Statistic 4.645362789
p -Value 0.199684983
Expected frequency assumption
       is fulfilled.
fo-fe
(fo-fe)^2/fe
ECONOMIC SATISFACTION
ECONOMIC SATISFACTION
Data
Results
Do not reject the null hypothesis
Observed Frequencies
Expected Frequencies
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YIELD & ECONOMIC SATISFACTION
Calculations
YIELD (ton/ha) Not Satisfied Somewhat Satisfied Mostly or Very Satisfied Total
< 8 18 7 2 27 3.176471 -0.941176 -2.235294
> 8 10 8 6 24 -3.176471 0.941176 2.235294
Total 28 15 8 51
YIELD (ton/ha) Not Satisfied Somewhat Satisfied Mostly or Very Satisfied Total
< 8 14.82352941 7.941176471 4.235294118 27 0.680672 0.111547 1.179739
> 8 13.17647059 7.058823529 3.764705882 24 0.765756 0.12549 1.327206
Total 28 15 8 51
Level of Significance 0.05
Number of Rows 2
Number of Columns 3
Degrees of Freedom 2
Critical Value 5.991476357
Chi-Square Test Statistic 4.190410053
p -Value 0.123045014
Expected frequency assumption
       is fulfilled.
fo-fe
(fo-fe)^2/fe
ECONOMIC SATISFACTION
ECONOMIC SATISFACTION
Data
Results
Do not reject the null hypothesis
Observed Frequencies
Expected Frequencies
ECONOMIC SATISFACTION & PAY STORAGE COST
Calculations
ECONOMIC SATISFACTION Not Interested Interested Total
Not Satisfied 20 8 28 1.333333 -1.333333
Satisfied 14 9 23 -1.333333 1.333333
Total 34 17 51
ECONOMIC SATISFACTION Not Interested Interested Total
Not Satisfied 18.66666667 9.333333333 28 0.095238 0.190476
Satisfied 15.33333333 7.666666667 23 0.115942 0.231884
Total 34 17 51
Level of Significance 0.05
Number of Rows 2
Number of Columns 2
Degrees of Freedom 1
Critical Value 3.841455338
Chi-Square Test Statistic 0.633540373
p -Value 0.426059649
Expected frequency assumption
       is fulfilled.
fo-fe
(fo-fe)^2/fe
PAY STORAGE COST
PAY STORAGE COST
Data
Results
Do not reject the null hypothesis
Observed Frequencies
Expected Frequencies
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HECTARES FOR GROWING CORN & HEDGING
Calculations
Row variable C1 C2 Total
R1 20 11 31 2.115385 -2.115385
R2 10 11 21 -2.115385 2.115385
Total 30 22 52
Row variable C1 C2 Total
R1 17.88462 13.11538 31 0.250207 0.341191
R2 12.11538 8.884615 21 0.369353 0.503663
Total 30 22 52
Level of Significance 0.05
Number of Rows 2
Number of Columns 2
Degrees of Freedom 1
Critical Value 3.841455
Chi-Square Test Statistic 1.464414
p -Value 0.226229
Expected frequency assumption
       is fulfilled.
Data
Results
Do not reject the null hypothesis
Observed Frequencies
Expected Frequencies
fo-fe
(fo-fe)^2/fe
Column variable
Column variable
GRAIN AS COLLATERAL & HECTARES GROWING CORN
Calculations
GRAIN AS COLLATERAL 5 - 15 16 -  30 31 - 50 > 50 Total
Not Interested 13 6 5 5 29 1.846154 -0.134615 -0.576923 -1.134615
Interested 7 5 5 6 23 -1.846154 0.134615 0.576923 1.134615
Total 20 11 10 11 52
GRAIN AS COLLATERAL 5 - 15 16 -  30 31 - 50 > 50 Total
Not Interested 11.15385 6.134615 5.576923 6.134615 29 0.30557 0.002954 0.059682 0.20985
Interested 8.846154 4.865385 4.423077 4.865385 23 0.385284 0.003725 0.075251 0.264594
Total 20 11 10 11 52
Level of Significance 0.05
Number of Rows 2
Number of Columns 4
Degrees of Freedom 3
Critical Value 7.814725
Chi-Square Test Statistic 1.30691
p -Value 0.727493
Expected frequency assumption
       is fulfilled.
fo-fe
(fo-fe)^2/fe
HECTARES GROWING CORN
HECTARES GROWING CORN
Data
Results
Do not reject the null hypothesis
Observed Frequencies
Expected Frequencies
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GRAIN AS COLLATERAL & LIVESTOCK
Calculations
GRAIN AS COLLATERAL No Yes Total
Not Interested 7 22 29 -0.807692 0.807692
Interested 7 16 23 0.807692 -0.807692
Total 14 38 52
GRAIN AS COLLATERAL No Yes Total
Not Interested 7.807692 21.19231 29 0.083554 0.030783
Interested 6.192308 16.80769 23 0.105351 0.038814
Total 14 38 52
Level of Significance 0.05
Number of Rows 2
Number of Columns 2
Degrees of Freedom 1
Critical Value 3.841455
Chi-Square Test Statistic 0.258502
p -Value 0.611151
Expected frequency assumption
       is fulfilled.
Data
Results
Do not reject the null hypothesis
Observed Frequencies
Expected Frequencies
fo-fe
(fo-fe)^2/fe
LIVESTOCK
LIVESTOCK
 
GRAIN AS COLLATERAL & YIELDS
Calculations
GRAIN AS COLLATERAL < 8 > 8 Total
Not Interested 15 14 29 -0.057692 0.057692
Interested 12 11 23 0.057692 -0.057692
Total 27 25 52
GRAIN AS COLLATERAL < 8 > 8 Total
Not Interested 15.05769 13.94231 29 0.000221 0.000239
Interested 11.94231 11.05769 23 0.000279 0.000301
Total 27 25 52
Level of Significance 0.05
Number of Rows 2
Number of Columns 2
Degrees of Freedom 1
Critical Value 3.841455
Chi-Square Test Statistic 0.001039
p -Value 0.97428
Expected frequency assumption
       is fulfilled.
Data
Results
Do not reject the null hypothesis
Observed Frequencies
Expected Frequencies
fo-fe
(fo-fe)^2/fe
YIELDS (ton/ha)
YIELDS (ton/ha)
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Appendix 5 Elevators in the Cienega Province 
 
 
GRAIN ELEVATORS IN THE CIENEGA 
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